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Abstract 
Through a thorough examination of Plato's writing, particularly of its dramatic 
features, I aim to demonstrate that the Phaedrus exhibits a decidedly political dimension. 
Moreover, the political content of the dialogue is not explicated but enacted in the shared 
friendship of Socrates and Phaedrus. Socrates' concern for his friend compels him to 
accompany Phaedrus outside the city, from which he has symbolically been alienated in 
virtue of his enthusiasm for rhetoric. The two friends find themselves vulnerable when 
outside the city and come to identify the need they each have for one another if they are 
safely to return. The first half of the dialogue features Socrates' ironic mimicking of 
Phaedrus in order to bring him to self-knowledge. The second half, conversely, reveals the 
extent to which Socrates himself lacks self-knowledge. Through an attuned dramatical 
reading, the Phaedrus reveals that friendship and politics share an essential connection. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
It is no secret that politics is an important issue for Plato; indeed, his two longest 
dialogues, the Republic and the Laws, deal with topics that are clearly political. However, 
both of these dialogues, as well as other political dialogues such as the Statesman and the 
Crito, are all very different from the Phaedrus, a dialogue that takes place outside the city 
and nearly an entire half of which is devoted to long monologues on love. Indeed, the 
Phaedrus, for these reasons, is decidedly different from any other of Plato's dialogues. 
Nevertheless, I want to offer a reading of the Phaedrus that is geared to emphasize its 
political implications. Doing so will involve some departures from the usual scholarly 
attention that the Phaedrus and other dialogues receive. 
1.1 Plato's Writing 
Plato's writing demands careful attention. This demand is even more pronounced when 
dealing with the Phaedrus, a dialogue in which writing itself is explicitly put at issue 
(274b-278b). My approach, now commonplace among interpreters of Plato, is to reject the 
assumption that everything out of the mouth of the character "Socrates" represents Plato's 
own position (Seventh Letter, 341 b-e). Such an assumption has led to many interpretive 
problems, solutions to which are now being offered by alternative approaches. 
My own approach consists ofthree main features. The first is increased attention to 
the dramatic element of the dialogue: 
As dramas the Platonic dialogues contain non-linguistic elements ... There are 
many references to deeds performed in the course of the conversation ... Persons 
come on and off the "stage," sit in silence ... , gesture and whisper to each other, 
[and] hide things under their cloaks ... (Griswold, 2002, pg. 94) 
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Often a reader is left wondering why a particular character says a particular thing. Dealing 
with such a question often draws on more than just an analysis of the meaning of what is 
said; it often draws also on such dramatic features as how the characters have been 
developed and in what setting the exchange occurs. My reading will give special 
consideration to the dramatic structure of the Phaedrus. 
The second main feature of my approach is to give special attention to the placement 
and use of certain words. For instance, some derivative of philia, the Greek word for 
"friendship," is placed at crucial junctures of the Phaedrus, such as at the very beginning 
and near the very end, and occurs frequently in the course of the conversation. As a result, 
the reader's attention is drawn to this particular word, its meaning, and its function in the 
dialogue. My treatment of this crucial theme (friendship) in particular, as well as to other 
repetitions and allusions in Plato's choice of language, will be apparent throughout this 
thesis. 
Finally, my attention to irony in the Phaedrus constitutes the third main feature of my 
approach. There are serious questions about the nature and extent of the irony in Plato's 
writing. In fact, "we are uncertain about the Irony itself. For it lies in the nature of Irony 
that its occurence in a text can hardly be proved to a reader who denies it" (Tigerstedt, 
1977, pg. 95). This is no less the case in the Phaedrus. As a result, what I interpret as 
"ironic" may elude a neat and tidy criterion for "Irony" that sufficiently underlies every 
instance I single out. Though I have tried nevertheless to explain each instance of irony I 
treat of, the following passage from Griswold's "Irony in the Platonic Dialogues" (2002, pg. 
88), provides a succinct expression of my overall treatment of Platonic irony. 
Irony may be a way of speaking (or writing) which is meant to point to what is 
not spoken (or written); it cannot be exercised without suggesting that 
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something has been held back by its author, or as one might also put it, 
concealed by its author .... Indeed, it is arguable that at least in Plato, irony is as 
much a way of revealing as it is of concealing, a way ofteaching and motivating 
the reader/auditor to look further. 
I will argue that, up until near the end of the Phaedrus, this account of irony applies to 
Socrates, who clearly intends to be ironic in the first half of the dialogue, as much as it does 
to Plato. Near the end of the dialogue, however, the irony will compound and thus provide 
the tense note that signals the climactic moment of the discussion. 
One final feature, though not a central one, of my concentration on Plato's writing in 
my approach to the Phaedrus will be to limit my focus as much as possible to the Phaedrus 
itself and to avoid excessive references to Plato's other dialogues. I view each of Plato's 
dialogues as self-contained units that need not necessarily rely on other dialogues for 
interpretation. Though love is the central concern of the Symposium, what is said about 
love in that dialogue differs in important respects from what is said about love in the 
Phaedrus. A reader intent on interpreting the dialogues according not to their explicit 
content alone but to Plato's writing as a whole need not attempt to reconcile two differing 
accounts of a single topic. Each dialogue sets specific issues in a specific context and, as a 
result, one must often look deeper than the surface meaning of particular philosophical 
arguments. I have tried to limit my reliance on other dialogues to references that add 
justification to some comments. Generally, I have tried not to base my interpretation of any 
part of the Phaedrus solely on material derived from other dialogues. 1 
1 The obvious exception is my invocation of the Phaedo as the interpretive ground of the palinode in the 
Phaedrus. However, as I argue in Chapter 3, I believe the Phaedrus clearly indicates that the Phaedo should 
provide this interpretive ground. 
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1.2 The Politics of the Phaedrus 
The first sentence of the introduction to Stephen Scully's recent (2003) translation of 
Plato's Phaedrus pronounces that "The Phaedrus is Plato's least political dialogue" (pg. 
vii). I have chosen to present my own reading of the Phaedrus as a response to and 
attempted refutation of Scully's assessment. My argument is that the politics is there; one 
simply needs to know where to look. I have already explained my wish to read the 
Phaedrus as a writing; that is, to consider every implication of its being a written work, and 
not just a work of philosophy.2 What will emerge from my reading is that the Phaedrus' 
political dimension is almost entirely contained within the elements of the dialogue usually 
ignored by interpreters, but which nevertheless significantly alter the purport of the explicit 
speeches and exchanges that make up the dialogue. 
The political side of the Phaedrus is intimately tied to the theme of friendship that 
runs all through the dialogue. As mentioned above, the Greek word for "friend," and its 
derivatives, are scattered all through the dialogue and in some cases placed very carefully 
at crucial points. The irony of the first half of the dialogue consists of Socrates' mimicking 
of Phaedrus, which is only possible in virtue of the friendship between the two. In the 
second half, friendship appears to be missing from the conversation, even though it remains 
enacted by the two discussants. Of course, none of this would be recognizable if it were not 
for the interaction and play between Socrates and Phaedrus, as well as other dramatic 
features, that suggest, without saying so, that the two are friends. 
Friendship, I will argue, figures as the protagonist against the antagonist of 
enthusiasm. The conversation between Socrates and Phaedrus, through which Socrates 
2 Indeed, it is my contention that the philosophy of the dialogues can only be fully engaged once one has read 
them this way. 
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wishes to curb Phaedrus' enthusiasm for rhetoric, takes place outside of the city. This 
setting is meant to call to the reader's attention that the city is at all times in the background 
throughout the dialogue. Phaedrus' leaving the city symbolically indicates that he cannot 
safely remain inside so long as he retains his enthusiasm. Phaedrus' interaction with other 
citizens of the polis, i.e. his political interaction, is seriously compromised by this aspect of 
his personality. His friendship with Socrates will prove to be that which can safely guide 
him back into the city and, as well, friendship itself will be shown to point the way to being 
able adequately to deal with those in the city who wish to take advantage of enthusiastic 
citizens. The political dangers of enthusiasm are thus set against the political safeguard of 
friendship. Indeed, friendship itself is a necessarily political theme, as its very possibility 
calls for a sustained interaction between at least two people, an interaction enacted in the 
Phaedrus. Though what is here considered "political" expands considerably beyond mere 
government or public policy, it is an interpretation which is offered in the Phaedrus itself 
(261 a-d) and thus requires consideration if the Phaedrus' political dimension is to be 
revealed. 
So, through sufficient attention to all literary aspects of the Phaedrus, I will proceed 
to draw out the pervasive theme of friendship in an attempt to demonstrate the pronounced 
political thrust this theme uncovers in the dialogue. 
1.3 Overview 
Chapter 2 provides an interpretation of Phaedrus 227a- 234c, covering the opening scene 
of the dialogue as well as the speech of Lysias as recited by Phaedrus. That the dialogue is 
set outside the city indicates not that the Phaedrus is unconcerned with politics but that its 
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situation relative to the city will serve to properly frame the dialogue's political dimension 
(2.1.1 ). The opening line of the dialogue draws attention to the political themes by 
mentioning friendship and questioning Phaedrus' movement out of the city (2.1.2). We 
soon see that Phaedrus' enthusiasm for rhetoric is driving him from the polis and that his 
friendship with Socrates will guide him back (2.1.3). The myth of Boreas, the first signpost 
of the dialogue, thematizes self-knowledge and how a lack thereof can jeopardize political 
engagement (2.1.4). As Phaedrus reads Lysias' speech, we see that in undermining the 
values of the polis (2.2.1 ), Lysias' considerable rhetorical skills present a danger to those 
susceptible to his cleverness (2.2.2). 
Chapter 3 provides an interpretation of Phaedrus 234c - 241 d, covering Socrates' 
first speech and the preceding transition from Lysias' speech. Here Socrates (a) begins to 
mimic Phaedrus (3.1.1) and (b) offers a criticism ofLysias' speech that will prove pivotal 
in interpreting Socrates' first speech (3.1.2). As Socrates playfully offers to recite a speech 
of his own, Phaedrus' enthusiasm for rhetoric is powerfully pronounced (2.1.3). In an effort 
to provoke Socrates to make good on his offer, Phaedrus returns Socrates mimetic play, a 
signpost that hints at the role Socrates' first speech will play in Phaedrus' path to self-
knowledge (3.1.4). As Socrates resists, however, Phaedrus' insistence indicates the 
underlying danger his enthusiasm presents to his friendship with Socrates (3.1.5), and thus 
to his ability safely to re-enter the city. To address this, Socrates comically forgets himself 
in his first speech in hopes of indicating to Phaedrus that he also has forgotten himself in 
his enthusiasm for Lysias' speech (3.2). 
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Chapter 4 provides an interpretation of Phaedrus 241d- 257b, covering the palinode3 
and the preceding transition from Socrates' first speech. Socrates' abrupt cessation of his 
speech is an enactment of one of his criticisms of Lysias' speech and further adds to the 
comic self-forgetting of his first speech ( 4.1.1 ). As Socrates continues to mimic Phaedrus, 
the latter's enthusiasm becomes even more pronounced ( 4.1.2). Socrates' last attempt at 
ironic mimicry occurs when he proclaims his need for purification from his blasphemy of 
love, a signpost of the dramatic role of the palinode (4.1.3). In the last moments of 
conversation before the beginning of the palinode, allusions to the Phaedo abound ( 4.2.1 ). 
We can see, with help from the Phaedo (4.2.2), that the palinode provides purification from 
the misuse of language in the Phaedrus, as do the arguments for the immortality of the soul 
in the Phaedo (4.2.3). 
Chapter 5 provides an interpretation of Phaedrus 257b - 279c, covering the myth of 
the cicadas as well as the discussion between Socrates and Phaedrus that constitutes the 
second half of the dialogue. Phaedrus' reaction to the palinode demonstrates that he has 
achieved self-knowledge and is thus purified from misuse of language ( 5 .1.1 ). Socrates' 
explanation of a politician's criticism of Lysias serves to demonstrate the irony involved in 
a contrast between what is said and what is done, and thus foreshadows the role such irony 
will play as the conversation nears its end (5.1.2). The myth of the cicadas proves to be a 
brilliant signpost, summarily indicating all the themes that are operative throughout the 
ensuing conversation. Here beauty, enthusiasm, philosophy, need, and friendship are all 
thematized in such a way as to properly frame the ultimate outcome ofthe dialogue (5.1.3). 
Socrates' and Phaedrus' subsequent discussion of the politics of speaking and writing 
3 Though little attention is given to the explicit content of the palinode itself (see section 5 .1.3 ), its dramatic 
role within the context of the Phaedrus is given extensive treatment in section 4.2. 
7 
expands the "political" to include all the interactions of the citizens of a city; this is to be 
kept in mind if the political dimension of the Phaedrus is to be unveiled ( 5 .2.1 ). Finally, as 
Socrates' enthusiasm for the dialectical method of collection and division grows (5.2.2), it 
reaches a point where, in the midst of condemning writing itself, he demonstrates the 
ridiculousness of his cherished method as he has explicated it. For, in its explication, 
Socrates has neglected to mention the supreme dialectical condition that has made the 
conversation in which he now participates possible: friendship. Friendship is thus shown to 
be conspicuously absent from the discussion yet present in the very occurrence of the 
discussion itself. Furthermore, that Socrates' even goes so far as to ignore Phaedrus at the 
dialogue's climax goes to show that, in act, he is neglecting the dialogical interchange that 
he is promoting in speech. Finally, through a layer of irony that suggestively points outside 
the dialogue, we find Plato outright defying Socrates' criticisms of writing; for Plato is 
writing in a fashion (i.e. dramatically) that allows him to demonstrate the ridiculousness of 
Socrates' condemnation (5.2.3). The Phaedrus ends by indicating to the reader the two 
central themes of the dialogue: (1) Phaedrus' last remark before he and Socrates leave is 
meant to remind the reader that the enactment of friendship has compelled the movement 
of the entire dialogue; and (2) that the two friends have not yet re-entered the city at the 
conclusion of the dialogue serves to once again indicate the presence and absence of the 
polis (5.3). 
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Chapter 2: 227a-234c 
2.1 Opening Conversation 
2.1.1 Setting 
That the Phaedrus takes place outside the city walls calls attention to the political element 
of the dialogue, even if in a negative way. Though several commentators (such as Scully, 
2003, and Sallis, 1996) have taken this unusual setting as a dramatic indication of Plato's 
attempt to exclude political issues from the concerns of the Phaedrus, there are several 
points where Plato explicitly calls attention to the setting of the dialogue in order to 
emphasize its political implications. That Socrates and Phaedrus leave the city at the 
beginning of the dialogue and head back at the end serves to remind the reader where the 
dialogue is taking place and what it is taking place in relation to, i.e. the city. At 230c, 
Phaedrus remarks that Socrates "appear[s] to be totally out of place."1 Socrates responds 
that "trees and open country won't teach me anything, whereas men in the town do" 
(230d). Here Plato not only calls attention to the fact that Socrates and Phaedrus are outside 
the city, but he explicitly characterizes Socrates as belonging in the city. Socrates seems 
especially out of place when we recall that even the threat of death could not compel him to 
leave the city (Sallis, 1996). To infer, therefore, that Socrates' leaving the city amounts to 
his transcending politics or engaging in something extra-political is groundless. Given that 
Socrates is especially disposed to engage in human affairs, that this one takes place outside 
the city is all that makes the Phaedrus unusual with respect to politics. In fact, Phaedrus' 
preparation for political discourse, in which Socrates is engaged all through this dialogue, 
takes place outside the city from necessity. As we shall see, only in this way can it 
1 Unless otherwise noted, Hackforth's translation (1952) has been adopted for all references to the text of the 
Phaedrus. 
2 See the Crito, esp. 52c. 
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emphasize a contrast between Phaedrus' enthusiasm for rhetoric and the self-knowledge, 
soon to be acquired, that will cure him of this enthusiasm and thus allow him properly to 
engage with the rhetoricians of the city; for Phaedrus must not return to the city until he is 
adequately able to do so.3 
2.1.2 The Opening Question 
There is a reason why Phaedrus is leaving the city as the Phaedrus begins. The first line of 
the dialogue, "my friend Phaedrus, where are you going and where do you come from?" 
(227a; Sallis' translation (1996, pg. 105)), immediately brings our attention to Phaedrus, 
his movement, and his relation to Socrates. Phaedrus is on his way somewhere, both 
literally and figuratively. Literally, he is on his way outside the city walls to recite to 
himself the speech Lysias has written. However, this movement outside the city is 
compromised by the added presence of Socrates, a "lover of learning" who insists that the 
countryside, unlike the city, has nothing to teach him (230d). The reader is meant to ask 
herself why Socrates would venture outside the city ifthis is the case.4 
That the opening line of the dialogue is a question asked of Phaedrus by Socrates 
indicates immediately that Socrates is interested in Phaedrus. The question concerns 
Phaedrus' movement; it is Socrates' first priority in encountering Phaedrus immediately to 
gauge his movement. He wants to know both where Phaedrus has been and where he is 
going. We now not only know ofthe movement but also the direction of the movement. 
3 No other interpreter I have read sees this political implication of Socrates and Phaedrus leaving the city. 
4 Based on Socrates' next remark, "Yet you seem to have discovered a recipe for getting me out [of the city]" 
(230d), Sallis surmises that "Socrates' attachment to logoi is stronger even than his bond to the city" (1996, 
pg. 117). Yet I will argue that Socrates is here beginning merely to mimic an attachment to logoi that is, in 
fact, Phaedrus', thus engaging in an irony that will soon become more pronounced (see Chapter 3). It is 
Socrates' attachment to his friend Phaedrus, not to logoi, that here leads him out of the city. 
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But why are the specifics of Phaedrus' activities important? Socrates eagerly agrees 
to join Phaedrus for his walk (227c-d). That this companionship comes so eagerly and so 
closely on the heels of Socrates' newly acquired knowledge of Phaedrus' movement should 
serve to alarm the reader: something is dreadfully wrong. No sooner does Socrates, out of 
obvious concern, learn where Phaedrus has been and where he is going than he eagerly 
agrees to accompany him out of the city. Furthermore, as noted above, Socrates has no 
interest in leaving the city. But he does have an interest in Phaedrus. Socrates, then, joins 
Phaedrus as a concerned friend, eager to join him on his path, to move with him. This close 
friendship, which endures throughout the whole of the dialogue, is signified by the very 
first words of the dialogue: "My friend Phaedrus ... " (227a). 5 Socrates friendship with 
Phaedrus will prove to be a pivotal element in the movement of the dialogue. 
We must keep in mind, though, that Socrates, in leaving the city, is not necessarily 
leaving the city behind. If Socrates truly is a man of the city, who has no interest in "trees 
and open country," then we can be sure that Socrates' concern for Phaedrus arises out of 
Phaedrus' movement out of the city. 6 This is Phaedrus' figurative movement. Phaedrus is 
not so much leading Socrates outside the city as Socrates is concerned to prepare Phaedrus 
5 Griswold interestingly points out that, "Socrates seems to extend the hand of friendship far more 
enthusiastically than does Phaedrus" because "he refers here to Phaedrus as phile, a gesture that Phaedrus 
does not return in his reply ... ", and thus emphasizes the lack ofprominence of their friendship for Phaedrus 
as the dialogue begins. However, he (and every other interpreter I have encountered) fails fully to recognize 
how friendship initiates and compels the dialogue's movement, as I will try to do. 
6 Sallis' discussion ( 1996, pgs. 1 05-9) of the full implications of Socrates' opening question comes very close 
to my own interpretation offered here. Yet he fails fully to explore the implications of the question with 
respect to Phaedrus, who after all is the friend, the lover of rhetoric, and the one who is leaving the city. 
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to re-enter the city. 7 In other words, Socrates IS gomg to guide his friend Phaedrus' 
movement back into the polis8. 
2.1.3 Lysias and Phaedrus 
Socrates' well-concealed alarm is triggered by Phaedrus' explanation that he has been with 
Lysias. Lysias was a famous attic orator who, 
spent much of his early manhood at Thurii in southern Italy, where he is said to 
have studied rhetoric under Tisias; on his return to Athens in 411 he may have 
taught rhetoric and acquired by the composition of showpieces the reputation 
which he enjoys in thePhaedrus ... " (Hamilton, 1973, pg. 13) 
Taylor adds that, "Lysias .. .is now at the height of his fame as a writer of logoi .. . " (1960, 
pg. 300). It is not insignificant, then, that Socrates immediately begins asking about Lysias; 
first, where he is and, second, what Phaedrus and Lysias were doing. In fact, Socrates is so 
eager to know the answer to the second question that he immediately guesses, "No doubt 
Lysias was giving the company a feast of eloquence" (227b). Ifwe take seriously the grave 
concern Socrates has for Phaedrus, we can perhaps infer that Socrates is not so much here 
giving his best guess as anticipating his worst fear. Given Socrates' attitude, in the rest of 
the Phaedrus, toward rhetorical speeches,9 we can here suspect that Lysias' reputation 
alone is enough to cause Socrates to fear for Phaedrus. Rhetorical speeches can be 
dangerous10, especially for someone as enthusiastic for them as Phaedrus. Thus, Socrates 
considers it "above all business" (227b) to accompany his friend. He even pledges, "I 
won't leave you even if you extend your walk as far as Megara, up to the walls and back 
7 This assertion contradicts the opinions of commentators I have read, all of whom believe Socrates is as 
addicted as Phaedrus to rhetoric. 
8 My repetition of the Greek word polis, "city," is meant to call attention to it as the origin of our "political" 
and its deriviatives. The relation of the dialogue's characters to the city emphasizes the political in a way I 
explain further in section 5 .2.1. 
9 See also the Gorgias. See Griswold, 2005, for an outline of the treatment of rhetoric in these dialogues. 
10 Socrates explains why at 260b-d (see section 5.2.1). 
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again ... " (227d). Insofar as Socrates is willing both to leave the city and to walk quite a 
long distance 11 , we are to understand the danger to be so imminent that Socrates is willing 
to take quite a risk for the sake of his friend. 
Socrates (and the reader) is given even more reason for concern when Phaedrus refers 
to Lysias as "the ablest writer of our day" (228a). He even goes so far as to say that he 
would rather the ability to repeat long speeches by heart than come into a fortune. Here is 
one of the first signs that Phaedrus is madly in love with rhetoric. It also explains Socrates' 
alarm at Phaedrus' movement; not only is Lysias the "ablest" rhetorician of the day (which 
makes him, in Socrates' eyes, a dangerous man indeed), but Phaedrus has an "enthusiasm 
for discourse" rivaled only by Simmias of Thebes (242a-b). That these two men have spent 
the day up to this point together indicates that the danger of rhetoric is especially likely to 
have had an effect on Phaedrus. 
It is fitting, then, that Socrates' next remark is a particularly strong statement of 
friendship with Phaedrus: "I know Phaedrus; yes indeed, I'm as sure of him as of my own 
identity" (228a). Socrates then proceeds to describe Phaedrus' psychology, how Phaedrus 
asked Lysias to repeat his speech, acquired a copy of that speech and studied it so carefully 
that he learned it by heart, and finally came upon another lover of discourse (i.e. Socrates) 12 
and, though playfully reluctant, meant to repeat the discourse to him nevertheless (228a-c ). 
Two things are noteworthy here: firstly, that Socrates does indeed know Phaedrus so well 
(Phaedrus does not deny any of Socrates' claims) is remarkable. Clearly, the two are close 
11 That the walk to Megara is a long one is indicated by Hamilton's note that Herodicus, who Socrates here cites 
as one who recommends a walk to Megara and back, is a physician who "particularly recommended long walks" 
(1973, pg. 22). 
12 Interestingly, Sallis concludes, based on this remark, that "by Socrates' own description of himself, he is a 
lover of logoi," thereby failing fully to acknowledge the playful, ironic reflection (for it is not Socrates but 
Phaedrus who is in love with discourse) in which Socrates engages here, and how Phaedrus returns this 
reflective play later in the dialogue (236c, see section 3.1.4). 
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friends indeed. Furthermore, that this emphasis on their friendship comes so near the very 
beginning of the dialogue stresses the role friendship plays in the subsequent movement of 
the dialogue. At crucial junctures13, it will be shown that the dialogue only proceeds in the 
way it does because of the closeness of the companions who take part in it. 14 For now, it is 
enough to note that the emphasis on this connection at the beginning of the Phaedrus 
shows that it is Socrates' first recourse in beginning to combat the effects of Lysias' 
speech. 
Secondly, if we can trust that Socrates does indeed know Phaedrus as well as he 
claims to, we are fully informed as to the extent of Phaedrus' enthusiasm for rhetoric, 
particularly that of Lysias. Indeed, that Phaedrus has already learned the speech by heart 
even before midday shows an obsession that is alarming in itself. Again, we can fully 
understand Socrates' concern for Phaedrus once we learn how susceptible Phaedrus is to 
the already persuasive rhetorical form. As Socrates has suspected all along, Phaedrus is in 
no position to participate in political discourse. He and others like him are merely 
enthusiasts for rhetoric. The task Socrates sets for himself is lovingly and attentively to 
guide Phaedrus' movement from being susceptible to rhetoric to being fully able to engage 
the rhetoricians of the city in critical discussion. Indeed, such movement will be necessary 
if Phaedrus is to safely re-enter the city. This political dimension of the Phaedrus, hitherto 
unnoticed as such by commentators I have read, shapes the entire dialogue. 
13 Such as 243e (see section 4.1.3), 259a (see section 5.1.3), and 279c (see section 5.3). 
14 I have read no interpreter as of yet who has identified the essential connection between the friendship 
presented in the dialogue and the movement of the friends. Griswold (1996, pgs. 32-3) makes some 
exceptionally sharp observations about both the movement and the friendship, but fails to connect the two in 
accordance with my present attempt. 
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2.1.4 The Myth of Boreas 
When Phaedrus asks whether Socrates believes the myth of Boreas15 (229c), Socrates' 
response is a somewhat elaborate comparison ofhis attitude toward myths with those of the 
sophists. 
I should be quite in the fashion ifl disbelieved it, as the men of science do ... For 
my part, Phaedrus, I regard such theories ... as the invention of clever, industrious 
people ... I myself have certainly no time for the business: and I'll tell you why, 
my friend: I can't as yet 'know myself, as the inscription at Delphi enjoins; and 
so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into 
extraneous matters. (229c-230a) 
This diatribe of Socrates' anticipates the speech of Lysias and, thus, the first stage of the 
movement the Phaedrus traces. In fact, we will see throughout the dialogue that this 
introductory conversation as well as each ofthe "transitions" (that is, the conversations that 
occur in between the speeches and just before the final discussion of dialectic) serves to 
foreshadow the next stage of Phaedrus' movement. Furthermore, they are meant as "hints" 
from Socrates to Phaedrus as to the "lesson" he is to learn from the ensuing speech or 
discussion. 16 Each of these "hints" serve as signposts for the next stage of Phaedrus' 
movement from enthusiast for clever rhetoric to participant in dialectical discourse. 17 
The discussion of the myth of Boreas, then, serves as the first signpost. Its first 
function is to indicate to the reader what about the upcoming speech of Lysias' is 
inadequate, as we will see. Its second function, however, is subtly to foreshadow the role of 
15 Nehamas and Woodruff note that, "According to legend, Oreithuia, daughter of Athenian king Erechtheus, 
was abducted by Boreas while she was playing with Nymphs along the banks of the Ilisus River. Boreas 
personifies the north wind" (1995, pg. 4, n.lO). 
16 Of course, none of these lessons take the form of instruction or a teaching. In fact, we will begin to notice 
that Socrates behaves as if he is the one making the crucial movements that, in fact, Phaedrus is making. This 
gives added significance to that question of Socrates' that opens the dialogue. Socrates and Phaedrus are such 
close friends that, as the next-to-last line of the dialogue makes clear, their movements are one and the same. 
Socrates guides Phaedrus in his movement by moving with him. 
17 To my knowledge, no other interpreter has noticed the signposts that reside in the transitions and serve to 
foreshadow the next stage in Phaedrus' movement. 
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myth in the dialogue. The mention of the Delphic oracle, as well as the question of whether 
Socrates is more or less like Typhon, the monster with a hundred heads, serves to show the 
role myth plays in his quest for self-knowledge (Sallis, 1996, pg. 116). Socrates' remark 
indicates that whether the myth of Typhon is true is of no consequence to him; rather, the 
myth serves as a frame with the aid of which Socrates can examine himself. The great 
mythic world of the palinode is here foreshadowed, as is the role it will play in allowing 
Phaedrus to know himself. 
2.2 Lysias' Speech 
2.2.1 Contradicting Convention 
Perhaps the most notable characteristic of Lysias' speech, giVen Socrates' foregoing 
"lesson," is its basic thesis: the non-lover should be preferred to the lover. Ferrari (1987, 
pg. 92) finds that "there is a certain magnificent audacity in the non-lover's suggestion ... " 
and notes that Lysias "violates social mores while staunchly maintaining a position of the 
strictest sobriety and decorum" (1987, pg. 252, n. 8). Griswold calls the non-lover's effort 
"singularly odd" (1986, pg. 45). It is evident that what Lysias proposes in his speech flies in 
the face of conventional wisdom about love. 
In this context, we can see the relation between Lysias and those sophists whom 
Socrates spoke of as concerned with the truth of myths. Like them, Lysias concerns himself 
with cleverly explaining away the accepted beliefs of society. Those "men of science" who 
Socrates says give scientific accounts of the traditional myths (229c) attempt to subvert 
accepted beliefs with scientific rationale. That Socrates does not attempt to participate, by 
reason of his inability to "as yet know myself' (230a), implies that, presumably, these men 
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of science would also do well to attempt to know themselves before attending to "the 
business" (229e). After all, they have yet to show any comprehensive success (229d-e). 
Socrates prepares to bring Phaedrus through the first stage of his movement by 
revealing something about Lysias' speech (even before it is read!): namely, that trying to 
explain away accepted beliefs can be time-consuming (it did, after all, take Lysias "weeks 
to compose at his leisure" (228a) his speech in defense of the non-lover) and largely 
unsuccessful. It is far more beneficial to examine oneself instead. In fact, as Socrates goes 
on to demonstrate, accepted myths and beliefs can be a lense through which one sees 
oneself more clearly. 18 
2.2.2 Profiteering 
The persuasive power of clever speech, for which Phaedrus has been shown to have a 
particular affinity, is dangerous in a much more serious way, however. Ferrari sheds light 
on a way in which Lysias' thesis in particular has quite a dangerous implication . 
. . . [One] of the functions served by conventional erotic behaviour was to mark 
off sexual relationships between aristocratic peers from those commercially 
procured ... Accordingly, the outrageous twist in the arguments of the non-lover 
is that by pooh-poohing the traditional agonies he comes close to using the boy 
as his whore. He is buying sex from him ... And the rhetorical challenge he 
dares to face is to deck out this proposal in the finery of rational concern for 
their mutual welfare. (1987, pg. 92) 
In essence, Lysias' non-lover has attempted to break down the barrier between aristocratic 
eros and prostitution. 
18 As we will see, the palinode is less a grand mythic adventure and more a genuine exercise in self-
knowledge through myth. While several commentators, especially Griswold ( 1996), have given appropriate 
treatment to the theme of self-knowledge in the Phaedrus, none I have read succeed in fully exploring how 
the palinode does this in light of the remarks Socrates makes about myth here at the beginning of the 
dialogue. See section 4.2.3. 
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I agree with Ferrari when he notes that, "Lysias is made to reveal something of 
himself through his fictional creation" (1987, pg. 252, n.8). Lysias is a rhetorician at the 
height of his powers. It is implicitly indicated here (and elsewhere 19) that this power to 
persuade can be quite effectively used to further one's own interests. In the case of 
sophists, who make their living through rhetorical speeches, their main interest is to make 
money. Lysias "would have written this display-piece to attract new fee-paying customers 
for his service as speechwriter. .. thereby risking the opprobrium that he commercializes 
what should have no price" (Ferrari, 1987, pg. 252, n. 8). Thus Lysias does indeed reveal 
himself through his character, the non-lover: both are willing cleverly to reverse the norms 
of the time for the sake of profit. 
Herein lies what is perhaps the greatest danger of clever, rhetorical speech. Socrates' 
alarm upon hearing that Phaedrus had spent the day being entertained with one of Lysias' 
speeches is precisely a consequence of his suspicion of rhetoric. As far as Socrates is 
concerned, those engaged in rhetoric, more often than not, have something to sell. Plato has 
revealingly attributed to Lysias a speech in which the speaker reflects the speech-writer; he 
is a man pursuing his interests through a clever twisting of the common way of looking at 
things. And, worst of all, he has been successful: Phaedrus is completely enamoured with 
Lysias' speech. Socrates, upon first meeting Phaedrus and learning of his recent activities, 
instantly realizes that his friend is in no position to deal adequately with the profit-making 
rhetoricians of Athens; he is at risk of being sold something, merely in virtue of the fact 
that it is cleverly assembled, that could harm him. Phaedrus, in other words, is in no 
position safely to engage in the affairs of the city; his leaving the city to recite Lysias' 
speech symbolizes his need for preparation before heading back. Now that Phaedrus' 
19 See the Protagoras, as well as Gonzalez's (2000) revealing commentary. 
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situation has been fully revealed through his attitude toward Lysias' speech, Socrates is in a 
position to begin guiding his movement so as to prepare him for safe re-entry into the city. 
As soon as Phaedrus finishes reciting Lysias' speech to Socrates, this preparation will 
begin. 
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Chapter 3: 234c-241d 
3.1 Socrates Prepares to Offer a Speech 
3.1.1 Irritation 
Immediately after finishing his recitation of Lysias' speech, Phaedrus' enthusiasm for it is 
again emphasized. "Isn't it extraordinarily fine, especially in point of language?" (234c) 
After Socrates agrees, but only insofar as he enjoys it vicariously through Phaedrus and not 
on its own merits, Phaedrus exclaims, "Come, come! Do you mean to make a joke of it?" 
(234d). Both de Vries (1969, pg. 72) and Rowe (1988, pg. 149) notice that Phaedrus 
expresses some irritation at Socrates' reluctance to join in the praising of the speech. 
Indeed, after Socrates asks, "Do you think I am joking, and don't mean it seriously?" 
(234d), Phaedrus responds, "No more of that, Socrates: tell me truly, as one friend to 
another, do you think there is anyone in Greece who could make a finer and more 
exhaustive speech on the same subject?" (234e). Given the strong friendship between 
Socrates and Phaedrus, established earlier in the dialogue, it should be alarming both to the 
reader and to Socrates that Phaedrus would react this way. It is a testament both to the 
power of Lysias' speech and to Phaedrus' vulnerability to it that he would so suddenly tum 
against his friend. Plato is continuing to emphasize the danger Phaedrus is in, a danger that 
has driven him away from the city and threatens to drive him away from his friends. 1 
In fact, when Socrates prefaces his next remark with "What?", he reveals some 
irritation of his own (De Vries, 1969, pg. 72). Yet that his irritation comes immediately 
after Phaedrus' own display of irritation serves to show the extent to which Socrates is 
1 Many commentators, such as White (1993) and Sallis (1996), regard the exchange between Socrates and 
Phaedrus during the transition to Socrates' first speech as simply playful. While the playfulness of the episode 
is apparent, I have read no interpretation that emphasizes the underlying danger of Phaedrus' behaviour, or 
what the source of that danger might be. 
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simply mimicking Phaedrus. After all, Socrates has just finished telling Phaedrus that he 
only enjoyed Lysias' speech because "I watched your apparent delight in the words as you 
read" (234c). Phaedrus and Socrates are so close that one's enjoyment gives way to the 
other's. Furthermore, it is only in virtue of their friendship that this is possible. As we will 
see, Socrates is only able to guide Phaedrus in his movement insofar as he is able to reflect 
Phaedrus in this way. Their friendship proves to be the basis for the possibility of 
movement. This makes Phaedrus' irritation with his friend all the more perilous. 
3.1.2 Lysias and Adequacy 
Socrates begins to criticize Lysias' speech: "[I]t really seemed to me that he said the same 
things several times over .. .In fact it struck me as an extravagant performance, to 
demonstrate his ability to say the same thing twice, in different words but with equal 
success" (235a). Perplexingly, Socrates says, "I couldn't think that even Lysias himself 
would deem it adequate" (235a). Why would Socrates remark that the author of the speech 
would consider it inadequate? Rowe (1988, pg. 150) suggests the following possible 
meaning of Socrates' remark: '"I thought Lysias was consciously struggling'." Struggling, 
that is, with finding things to say. White (1993, pg. 28) asserts that, "Surely if Lysias, one 
of the premier [sic] rhetoricians in Greece, would not have thought that its rhetoric was 
adequate, then he would have either withdrawn this speech or written another one." 
However, it seems that White has missed an important element here: Socrates can so easily 
find fault with Lysias' speech because Lysias never meant, in the first place, to write the 
speech in accordance with Socratic standards. It is, instead, Lysias' intention cleverly to 
reverse the accepted wisdom of the polis in order to establish himself as rhetorical master. 
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As we will see at the beginning of Socrates' first speech, however, Lysias does struggle 
against himself in a way that Socrates' first speech will illustrate further. 
3.1.3 The Source of Socrates' Speech 
At first, it would seem that Socrates has done very little to diminish Phaedrus' enthusiasm 
for pretty speeches. Indeed Socrates, in offering to recite another speech, seems only to be 
feeding Phaedrus' fever; he is so eager to hear this speech, in fact, that he is completely 
uninterested in its source. Yet, the source is unknown even to Socrates. "I am of course 
well aware it can't be anything originating in my own mind, for I know my own 
ignorance ... " (235c). It is worthwhile, looking ahead, to note that this famous claim of 
Socrates' (Apology, 21b-23b) is not completely unrelated to the Delphic command to 
"know thyself." Socrates knows his own ignorance only as a result of his examination of 
himself. However, there is a thick layer of irony at work here. Firstly, the speech Socrates 
is about to give cannot be other than his own. His attribution of the speech to Sappho or 
Anacreon is comedic; "How on earth could Socrates have heard anything in praise of the 
non-lover from Sappho or Anacreon, of all people - two of the best-known love-poets of 
antiquity" (Rowe, 1988, pg. 151 )? Furthermore, the whole passage where he denies 
authorship smacks of the usual, over-the-top Socratic modesty and self-deprecation. 
However, there is another level of irony here, which will be seen through an examination of 
the first speech: in that speech, Socrates demonstrates, on the surface at least, how little he 
knows himself- and he does this solely for Phaedrus' benefit. 
Phaedrus' response to Socrates' denial of authorship is to say, "I don't mind your not 
telling me, even though I should press you, from whom and how you heard it, provided you 
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do just what you say ... " (235d). In other words, Phaedrus is simply itching to hear this 
additional speech. Sallis (1996, pg. 119) sees that "Phaedrus clearly recognizes that 
Socrates is being ironic on this point," and Hackforth (1952, pg. 36) notices that, "When 
Socrates says that he has stupidly forgotten the exact source of inspiration, even Phaedrus 
seems to see through the fiction." Both these authors may be correct as to whether or not 
Phaedrus is aware of Socrates' playful irony, but they also miss the point. Plato is trying to 
emphasize the extreme urgency with which Phaedrus is pressing Socrates to get on with his 
speech2, an urgency that will become all the more pronounced in its desperation in a few 
moments. That Phaedrus is dismissive of the source of the speech altogether illustrates the 
extent of his enthusiasm. 
3.1.4 The Self-Knowledge Signpost 
Phaedrus next remarks that he will "undertake like the nine Archons to set up at Delphi a 
golden life-size statue, not only of myself but of you also" if Socrates delivers what he 
promises, i.e. a better speech than Lysias' .3 In short, the implication is that Phaedrus will 
have committed some transgression if Socrates is successful. Sallis' explanation of 
Phaedrus' remarks are excellent and worth quoting at length. 
[I]f Socrates delivers a better speech, then Phaedrus must. .. have been convicted 
of breaking a law. But. .. what law would Phaedrus have broken? His reference to 
Delphi ... and the fact that Phaedrus' promise comes immediately after 
Socrates' ... statement ... about his ignorance ... strongly suggest that the law which 
Phaedrus would prove to have broken would be the Delphic command "Know 
2 See note 1, pg. 20, above. 
3 Nehamas and Woodruff note that "the archons were magistrates chosen by lot in classical Athens. On taking 
office they swore an oath to set up a golden statue if they violated the laws" (1995, pg. 14, n. 31). Rowe adds 
that, "They [i.e. the archons] presumably have no expectation of having to fulfill their promise; and by going 
one better than them - two statues instead of one - Phaedrus underlines that neither does he. The bet is, he 
thinks, that Socrates will be unable to deliver" (1988, pg. 152). See also Thompson (1973, pgs. 21-22) for an 
elaborate explanation. 
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thyself. "4 •.. Presumably, it would be on account of his having proved not really to 
know Socrates very well, in the sense of not knowing that Socrates can give ... a 
better speech than Lysias' ... This could be the case only if the two tasks, knowing 
himself and knowing Socrates, were not independent, only if there were an 
essential connection between them. (1996, pg. 120-121) 
Sallis goes on to say that Phaedrus' proposal to set up statues both of himself and of 
Socrates "amounts to a proposal to set up images through which to see himself and his 
beloved, and by coming to see his beloved he comes that much more to see himself. .. " 
(1996, pg. 121 ). Above5, we saw Socrates in the act of mimicking Phaedrus when he 
partook in Phaedrus' delight of Lysias' speech (instead of enjoying the speech on his own 
terms). Thus this reference to the statues Phaedrus will erect symbolizes the way in which 
the two friends will reflect each other throughout the dialogue. In fact, Socrates almost 
immediately engages in this reflection once again by re-enacting Phaedrus' playful 
reluctance at the beginning of the dialogue. "Have you taken me seriously, Phaedrus, for 
teasing you with an attack on your darling Lysias? Can you possibly suppose that I shall 
make a real attempt to rival his cleverness with something more ornate?" (236b; see 228a, 
where Phaedrus asks, "Do you expect an amateur like me to repeat. .. the work of the ablest 
writer of our day ... ?). 
It is here that we find the next "hint," the signpost that marks the next stage of 
Phaedrus' movement in the dialogue. Socrates acts in this way, a way which reflects 
Phaedrus' own actions at the beginning of the dialogue, in order to provoke recognition in 
Phaedrus. 6 Indeed, Phaedrus takes the bait and capitalizes: 
4 See section 3 .1.3 above. 
5 Section 3 .1.1. 
6 Though several interpreters of the Phaedrus notice that Socrates is openly mimicking Phaedrus in parts of 
this section, none, to my knowledge, notice the extent to which Socrates continues to mimic him all 
throughout this section, nor do they identify the function of such reflection as a guide to self-knowledge. 
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As to that, my friend, I've got you where I can return your fire. Assuredly, you 
must do what you can in the way of a speech, or else we shall be driven, like 
vulgar comedians, to capping each other's remarks. Beware: do not deliberately 
compel me to utter the words 'Don't I know my Socrates? If not, I've forgotten 
my own identity', or 'He wanted to speak, but made difficulties about it'. (236c) 7 
Thus it is indicated that the next stage ofPhaedrus' movement will be to recognize himself 
in what others say. In other words, Phaedrus is acquiring self-knowledge. Thus, Socrates' 
first speech will serve as a "lesson" in self-recognition- i.e., self-knowledge. 
3 .1.5 Love of Speeches 
However, though Phaedrus is successful in recognizing himself in Socrates' playful irony 
during this episode, we are immediately reminded that Phaedrus' feverish love of speeches 
is still affecting him. He threatens Socrates with physical force, saying "we are by 
ourselves in a lonely place, and I am stronger and younger than you: ... please don't make 
me use force to open your lips" (236c-d). When Socrates tries his trick again, referring to 
himself as an amateur as did Phaedrus at 228a, Phaedrus ignores him and comes up with an 
even more serious threat against Socrates. Clearly, Phaedrus' passion for rhetoric 
constitutes a risk to his close friendship with Socrates. White, in light of Phaedrus' final 
remark of the dialogue (279c), finds that, 
in true friendship, there would be no need or inclination for the coyness 
characterizing the relation between Phaedrus and Socrates in their early 
exchanges on rhetoric; it is a measure of the distance separating Phaedrus and 
Socrates from true friendship that they initially bandy these speeches about in this 
way.(1993,pg.31) 
However, Plato has been at pains to emphasize the extent to which Socrates and Phaedrus 
are true friends, if only to emphasize the danger Phaedrus' susceptibility to pretty speeches, 
7 Indeed, Phaedrus' attempt to parody Socrates here goes so far as to cause him, a moment later, to quote 
Pindar, as did Socrates near the beginning of the dialogue (227b). Phaedrus says, "mistake not thou my 
bidding," (236d) which we can identify as Pindar's from its use in the Meno, 76d (Rowe, 1988, pg. 152). 
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such as that of Lysias', presents to that friendship. In fact, they "bandy these speeches 
about" only because Socrates, in an attempt to provoke self-recognition in Phaedrus, has 
deliberately mimicked the way he behaved at the beginning of the dialogue. This attempted 
provocation, furthermore, is a function of Socrates' guidance of Phaedrus back towards the 
city, a guidance undertaken purely out of friendship, as we have seen (section 2.1.2). Thus, 
White (as well as any other interpreter with whom I am familiar) fails to see the crucial role 
friendship plays in this exchange. 
Phaedrus finally threatens to "never again declaim or report any other speech by any 
author whatsoever" (236e). This turns out to be "the means of compelling a lover of 
discourse to do your bidding!" (236e). Socrates concedes and prepares to give the speech. 
It is interesting, however, in light of the speech to come, that Socrates' professed love of 
speeches turns out to be the weakness that leads him to deliver his speech. This seems also 
to be an attempt to mimic Phaedrus, whose love of speeches has been the launching pad of 
the entire dialogue; but, insofar as this is the case, it serves to frame the way in which 
Socrates' speech will guide Phaedrus towards self-recognition. Whether Socrates is 
accurately characterized as a speech-lover in other Platonic dialogues is not at issue here; in 
the Phaedrus he adopts this label only in order to enact the danger Phaedrus is putting 
himself in. 8 White suggests that, "Socrates' shame is caused by the fact that he has allowed 
his love of discourses to overpower his natural modesty ... " (1993, pg. 33). Recall that, at 
228c, Phaedrus is revealed as reluctant to recite the speech of Lysias, "though he meant to 
do so ultimately," even after admitting being an "amateur" (228a). There, Phaedrus' love of 
speeches clearly overpowered his natural modesty. Socrates is continuing to mimic 
8 All other interpreters, as far as I know, simply take Socrates' claim to be a speech-lover in earnest. 
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Phaedrus here9, but in a much more meaningful way. As he prepares to offer his first 
speech, Socrates has set it up so it can illustrate the danger Phaedrus' love of speeches 
presents. 
3 .2 Socrates' First Speech 
3.2.1 Dramatic Setting 
Socrates immediately prefaces his speech in a way Lysias did not. This preface provides a 
dramatic setting that will prove pivotal in the interpretation of the role this speech plays in 
Phaedrus' movement. 
... [O]nce upon a time there was a handsome boy, or rather a young man, who had 
a host of lovers; and one of them was wily, and had persuaded the boy that he was 
not in love with him, though really he was, quite as much as the others. And on 
one occasion, in pressing his suit he actually sought to convince him that he ought 
to favour a non-lover rather than a lover. And this is the purport of what he said: 
(237b) 
Both White (1993, pg. 37) and Sallis (1996, pg. 124) notice that Socrates is here making 
explicit what was implicit in Lysias' speech: that the supposed "non-lover" is actually only 
concealing himself as such. He is, "as much as the others," in love with the boy: 
As Socrates intimated earlier, with regard to Lysias' speech ... , so here it is 
explicit that the intention behind the speech, i.e., the end to which it is dedicated, 
has nothing to do with truth but only with persuading others in whatever way is 
advantageous to oneself. (Sallis, 1996, pg. 124) 
Socrates, in adding this preface, is trying to illustrate to Phaedrus what he had expected all 
along: that Lysias' speech is not a genuine exercise in truth-telling but instead an ingenious 
ploy, executed for the sake of profit. Lysias' motives reflect the motives ofthe non-lover of 
his speech. This motive is the locus of the danger away from which Socrates is trying to 
steer Phaedrus. Also, however, the revelation of the true nature of the "non-lover" will 
9 And White has overlooked this dramatic feature. 
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serve to frame the interpretation of the rest of the speech, which first seeks to define love 
and then to outline the disadvantage of granting favours to the lover. We will see that if we 
keep in mind that the non-lover is, in reality, a lover, a strange twist must be perceived in 
his words. 
3.2.2 Definition 
My boy, if anyone means to deliberate successfully about anything, there is one 
thing he must do at the outset: he must know what it is he is deliberating about; 
otherwise he is bound to go utterly astray. Now most people fail to realise that 
they don't know what this or that really is: consequently when they start 
discussing something, they dispense with any agreed definition, assuming that 
they know the thing; then later on they naturally find that they agree neither with 
each other nor with themselves. (237b-c) 
On the surface, the need to find a definition (in this case, a definition of love) on which to 
deliberate seems to be a merely formal improvement upon Lysias' speech, which offered 
no such definition. This is what lay behind Socrates' earlier remark (235a; see section 
4.1.2) that even Lysias himself would not have found his own speech adequate. Those who 
neglect adequately to define the terms on which they wish to deliberate find themselves 
agreeing "neither with each other nor with themselves" (237c). Lysias, in not including a 
definition of love in his speech, can plausibly be said to be in disagreement with himself in 
the same way that Socrates, in other dialogues 10, causes internal disagreement amongst 
those who have not identified a definition on the basis ofwhich they are arguing. 11 
However, the attempt to define love, placed as it is at the beginning of the speech, 
sheds light on another aspect of the speech: it as an attempt to improve on Lysias' speech 
while treating of the same theme as Lysias. At the same time as he is trying to make 
10 Such as the Meno, Theaetetus, Republic, etc., etc. 
11 To my knowledge, no other interpreter has noticed this eventual justification of Socrates' earlier remark 
that "I couldn't think that even Lysias himself would deem [his own speech] adequate" (235a). 
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explicit through his dramatic setting what is implicit in Lysias' speech (namely, that the 
non-lover is in fact a lover), Socrates must nevertheless keep his promise to deliver a 
speech on the same theme as Lysias. However, the dramatic setting serves to reveal the 
falseness of Lysias' speech: the non-lover is a concealed lover. Despite this revelation, the 
non-lover must define love in such a way as to be conducive to his argument that the 
beloved should favour the non-lover, in accordance with Lysias' thesis (236d). One might 
be tempted to ask why things must be so complicated; why does the non-lover not simply 
define love as best he can and unmask himself as lover? In this way, Socrates is at pains to 
demonstrate the utter ridiculousness of Lysias' speech. The improvement over Lysias' 
speech with respect to form serves to bring to light the implausibility of favouring the non-
lover over the lover; it will inevitably reduce to an argument to favour the lover. Socrates' 
improvement in form accommodates this reduction more so than the implicit deception of 
Lysias' speech. In turn, the true motive of Lysias' speech has been revealed: to twist and 
turn the accepted norms of society in order to compose a speech the cleverness of which 
blinds speech-lovers to the falseness of its thesis. 
3.2.3 The Comedy of Self-Forgetting 
Socrates' speech proceeds to explore the perils of favouring the lover. The lover, for 
instance, will take pleasure in defects of mind such as ignorance, cowardice, poor speaking, 
and slow thinking (239a). Furthermore, the lover will prevent the boy from, first, 
"consorting with others" and, second, pursuing "divine philosophy" (239b ). What is most 
noticeable here is how much the boy, if (presumably12) he is to favour the non-lover over 
12 Socrates, in lieu of listing the benefits of favouring the non-lover, simply says that, "to each evil for which I 
have abused the one party [i.e. the lover] there is a corresponding good belonging to the other" (24le). 
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the lover, will resemble Socrates. Socrates' wisdom (Apology, 23b), bravery (Symposium, 
220e; Laches, 181b), eloquence, and quick-mindedness (these last are displayed in his 
speeches in the Phaedrus, both of which are not only brilliant but are composed on the 
spot) are well-known attributes of the man. Furthermore, Socrates is also quite famous for 
consorting with others (Apology, 23b) and is the very paradigm of the philosopher. 
With respect to concerns of the body, Socrates' non-lover goes on to say that the boy, 
if he is to favour the lover over the non-lover, "will be of a physical type which in wartime, 
and other times that try a man's mettle, inspires confidence in his enemies and alarm in his 
friends, aye and in his very lovers too" (239d). Again, this situation would presumably be 
reversed if the boy were to favour the concealed non-lover. Insofar as Socrates is known to 
have a tough body (Symposium, 220b-c) and to be an exceptional soldier (Symposium, 
220d-221c), we can say that the boy would again resemble Socrates. 
Socrates' non-lover continues and, with respect to property and possessions, remarks 
that the lover will try and deprive his beloved of "father and mother, kinsmen and friends" 
and "will want his beloved to remain as long as possible without wife or child or home ... " 
(239e-240a). A boy with many friends and with a wife and child will, again, resemble 
Socrates, whose many friends are interlocutors in various dialogues and whose wife and 
child appear in the Phaedo (60a; 116b). 
It is obvious by now that there is a sense in which Socrates' concealed non-lover 
wishes to cultivate his beloved in such a way that the latter will develop a character that is 
strikingly similar to that of Socrates. Thus, the boy who favours the non-lover will tum out 
the most Socratic. But the non-lover is actually a lover- and so is Socrates! 13 Hackforth 
13 See 227c. 
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recogmzes this14 when he mentions that, "we see the lover peepmg through the 
disguise ... the true lover as conceived by Socrates and Plato" (Hackforth, 1952, pg. 40). 
Socrates, through the mouth of his deceptive non-lover, is recommending that the boy 
favour the non-lover and not the lover. By extension, the boy should not favour Socrates. 15 
Insofar as this interpretation is correct, it can now be seen how Socrates has turned the 
ludicrousness of Lysias' thesis into a comedy. Socrates has just composed a speech in 
which he condemns himself, a lover, as a suitable companion. He has forgotten himself. 16 
But this self-forgetting serves to illustrate an important stage in Phaedrus' movement. 
The comedy of Socrates' first speech is an illustration of how forgetting oneself or failing 
to recognize oneself- to know oneself- can go hand-in-hand with one's vulnerability to 
those who wish to dress up false speeches in fine language (234c ). After all, Socrates 
forgets himself only as a result of his effort to maintain Lysias' thesis, now proven false. 
As such, Socrates' first speech dramatically emphasizes the dangerous self-forgetfulness 
that Phaedrus risks. The signpost just before Socrates' speech consisted in an exercise, for 
Phaedrus, in self-recognition. Then, in playfully neglecting to recognize himself in his own 
speech, Socrates hopes to provoke Phaedrus to recognize this self-forgetting. Finally, if 
Phaedrus can recognize this, he may also, by extension, recognize Socrates' continuing 
mimicry; Socrates' playful self-forgetting mimics Phaedrus' own self-forgetting in his 
overly-enthusiastic receptivity to Lysias' rhetoric. Once Phaedrus has learned to recognize 
himself- that is, to know himself- he has achieved a crucial first step in engaging with a 
14 Yet he fails to draw out the implications, as I will now try to do. 
15 Socrates' non-lover insults the "elderly lover" (240c) by lamenting the boy's "extremity of discomfort. .. as 
he looks upon a face which years have robbed of its beauty ... " (240d-e ). Socrates explicitly refers to himself 
as "elderly" (227c) in the Phaedrus, and his notorious ugliness is acknowledged in the Theaetetus (143e), as 
well as in other extant sources (Nails, 2005). 
16 I have yet to read an interpreter who notices this ironic self-forgetting of Socrates' first speech. 
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polis composed of those who wish to exercise their influence through clever yet false 
arguments. 
32 
Chapter 4: 241d-257b 
4.1 Transition 
4.1.1 Continuing the Speech 
That Socrates' speech ends rather abruptly is indicated by Phaedrus' thinking it was only 
"half-way" through (241d). The reason why Socrates refuses to go on to describe the 
virtues of the non-lover hinges on Socrates' very first observation concerning Lysias' 
speech. At 235a, Socrates observes that Lysias "said the same things several times over... 
In fact, it struck me as an extravagant performance, to demonstrate his ability to say the 
same thing twice, in different words but with equal success." Now, however, instead of 
committing this error himself, Socrates says, 
I therefore tell you, in one short sentence, that to each evil for which I have 
abused the one party there is a corresponding good belonging to the other. So 
why waste words? All has been said that needs saying about them both." (241 e) 
So, Socrates' refusal essentially to repeat himself is another improvement upon 
Lysias' speech with regard to form 1, a complement at the end ofthe speech to his addition 
of a definition oflove and a dramatic setting at the beginning of the speech. However, these 
additions proved fatal to the speech, as it forced Socrates comically to forget himself for 
the sake of the thesis he promised to maintain (see section 3.2). Likewise, we can see that 
this last improvement to Lysias' speech with regard to form, the refusal to say the same 
thing differently, is equally harmful to Socrates' speech. If Socrates had felt comfortable 
explaining the virtues of the non-lover, if, that is, it would not be a matter of repeating 
himself to do so, it would have been pivotal in upholding his thesis that "surrender should 
be to one who is not in love rather than to one who is" (227c). So far, Socrates has merely 
1 I have read no other interpreter who notices that Socrates' ending his speech this way falls into accord with 
his earlier criticism that Lysias repeated himself. 
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explained why one should not surrender to the lover; explanation of why one should prefer 
the non-lover is far more to the point. Furthermore, it would not have been adequate to 
reverse the order - to argue why the non-lover should be preferred before arguing why the 
lover should not. Love is defined at the beginning of the speech "so that we may have it 
before our minds as something to refer to while we discuss whether love is beneficial or 
injurious" (237c-d). So Socrates must first explain why love is injurious rather than 
beneficial, which involves explaining why the lover is to be avoided. Thus Socrates' refusal 
to explain the virtues of the non-lover, because it would involve his repeating himself as 
did Lysias, serves to further undermine the credibility of his comedic first speech. 
4.1.2 Enthusiasm 
Of course, there is yet another reason why Socrates decides not to continue the speech: he 
fears the impending madness of possession to which he is at risk while giving it (241e). 
That Socrates is clearly wary of this possibility is an indication of the danger he believes 
himself to be in, as is his intention to "take myself off across the river here before you drive 
me to greater lengths" (242a). In actuality, though, given that Socrates is continuing to 
mimic his friend Phaedrus, the reader realizes that Socrates himself is not in any danger; it 
is rather Phaedrus who is at risk of what Socrates fears. As a result, this section of the 
dialogue, leading up to the palinode, conveys a strong sense of urgency and is dramatically 
much more serious. This seriousness is thematized in Socrates' response to Phaedrus' pleas 
that Socrates not leave; "Let us wait and discuss what we've heard ... " (242a). Socrates 
says, "Phaedrus, your enthusiasm for discourse is sublime, and really moves me to 
admiration" (242a). This "admiration" is, of course, purely ironic, for it is exactly what 
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Socrates feigns to admire, Phaedrus' "enthusiasm," that presents the danger of which 
Socrates is so wary.2 It will be the palinode's function to finally break the spell of this 
enthusiasm for discourse; and, once broken, the discussion of "what we've heard" that 
Phaedrus requests can finally commence. As expected, Phaedrus reacts to Socrates' 
announcement of yet another speech with, "[it] might be a lot worse!" (242b); "a humorous 
understatement to express his delight," according to Hackforth (1952, pg. 53). His 
enthusiasm, the reader can see, has not subsided. 
4.1.3 The Signpost 
Socrates' explanation as to why he must offer the palinode foreshadows the "lesson" 
contained in the palinode. All of a sudden, the language here becomes noticeably more 
religious. First of all, Socrates explains that his divine sign kept him from crossing the river 
"until I had made atonement for some offence to heaven" (242c ). Secondly, Socrates 
relates his belief that, 
the mind itself has a kind of divining power; for I felt disturbed some while ago 
as I was delivering that speech, and had a misgiving lest I might, in the words of 
Ibycus, 
By sinning in the sight of God win high renown from man. (242c-d) 
Lastly, Socrates condemns the two speeches as "somewhat blasphemous" (242d) for they 
treated love, "a god or a divine being" (242e ), as evil. "That then was their offence towards 
Love, to which was added the most exquisite folly of parading their pernicious rubbish as 
though it were good sense because it might deceive a few miserable people and win their 
applause" (242e-243a). 
2 Though commentators differ on how to interpret this crucial transition between Socrates' first speech and 
the palinode, none to my knowledge have read it as a continuation of the mimetic play between Socrates and 
Phaedrus that began before Socrates' first speech. 
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All these references to the gods and to blasphemy serve to foreshadow the strong 
theological content of the palinode. The huge mythic landscape of that forthcoming speech 
depicts the gods in their own domain, "the revolving heaven" from which they observe the 
"regions without" (247c). The souls of human beings, some of whom have caught a 
fleeting glimpse of these regions, are in a position to recollect "that which truly is" (249c ). 
The specific recollection on which the palinode focuses, however, is that of true beauty 
(249dff.), foreshadowed by Socrates when he vows to recite his palinode "no longer veiling 
my head for shame, but uncovered" (243b ); he can recite a speech about beauty because the 
sight of his beautiful companion allows for recollection. Thus it is the myth of true beauty 
and its proper recollection that constitutes the "lesson" that Phaedrus will learn from the 
palinode, and will prove decisive in breaking the spell ofhis enthusiasm for discourse. 
However, there is a pronounced political side to this aspect of the palinode. "Renown 
from man" (242d) is identified as a dishonorable motive for speechwriting. Indeed, 
speeches motivated in this way are shown to give way to blasphemy and offence. Here we 
perhaps have the Phaedrus' most straightforward condemnation of rhetoric for rhetoric's 
sake, and why such rhetoric is so "terrible" (242d) is of pivotal importance for 
interpretation of the movement of the Phaedrus. The human beings of the polis, whom 
rhetoricians like Lysias hope to persuade through speech, are shown in the palinode to have 
only the faintest hope of even a glimpse of "that which truly is" (249c). Thus, Socrates' 
quotation from Ibycus is quite appropriate; speeches written for the sake of "applause" and 
"renown" amount to a sin "in the sight of God" because humans have no knowledge of the 
standards against which speeches can be adequately judged. 
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It is for this reason that Phaedrus' self-knowledge has been such a crucial issue up to 
this point in the dialogue. Such knowledge, once achieved, can finally allow Phaedrus to 
recognize his all-too-human inability to judge the adequacy of the speeches he hears in the 
city. It is an issue, though, that takes a significant step toward resolution when Socrates 
asks, "Where is that boy I was talking to? He must listen to me once more, and not rush off 
to yield to his non-lover before he hears what I have to say" (243e). Though literally 
Socrates is referring to the fictional addressee of his first speech, Phaedrus clearly 
recognizes that he himself is the true addressee of the coming palinode when he responds, 
"Here he is, quite close beside you, whenever you want him" (243e). Phaedrus here, with a 
direct connection to Socrates' first speech, shows that he is now finally coming to know 
himself. 
4.2 The Phaedo and the Palinode 
4.2.1 Allusions 
As we approach the palinode's beginning, there are several noticeable allusions to the 
Phaedo. To start with, Socrates characterizes Phaedrus' enthusiasm for discourse, which it 
will be the task of the palinode to tame, by remarking that "no one ... has been responsible 
for more [discourses] than you ... with one exception, Simmias of Thebes" (242b ). 
"Simmias of Thebes" (Phaedo, 59c) is listed as one of the interlocutors of the Phaedo; 
indeed, he is one of the two main interlocutors (along with Cebes) and Hackforth mentions 
that "his determination to thrash out the subject under discussion to the bitter end is 
forcibly expressed" (1952, pg. 54) in that dialogue (Phaedo, 85c). That Simmias' 
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enthusiasm is at issue in the Phaedo suggests that the way it is dealt with there may provide 
a key to the way Phaedrus' similar behaviour is dealt with here. 3 
Next, Socrates notes that "the mind itself has a kind of divining power" (242c). Here, 
"mind" translates the Greek word ''psyche" {Thompson, 1973, pg. 37), the immortality of 
which is precisely what is at issue in the Phaedo. Furthermore, Socrates' remark here 
foreshadows the human soul's "divine" ability to recollect "that which truly is," of which it 
caught a glimpse before embodiment. This mythical telling of the plight of the soul, and the 
ability of recollection which results from its journey, is closely tied thematically to the 
immortality of the soul. In fact, Socrates briefly asserts the soul's immortality before 
launching into the palinode. Thus, the psyche's "divining power" is thematically linked 
with the Phaedo. 
In this connection, that Socrates discusses the soul's immortality near the beginning 
of the palinode is a remarkably direct allusion to the Phaedo in itself. The key thing to note 
here, however, is that Socrates' discussion of the soul's immortality in the Phaedrus is 
different in subtle yet important ways from that in the Phaedo. These differences have 
given rise to many of the problems encountered by interpreters who wish to derive a single, 
coherent philosophy from Plato's dialogues. However, that the two proofs differ is an 
important interpretive detail in itself. As we will see, both "proofs" are shaped so as to be 
appropriate to their respective situations; their purpose is not to provide a single, coherent 
argument for the immortality of the soul. 
Lastly, and most importantly, Socrates expresses the need to "purify" himself after his 
first speech. Of course, the irony of Socrates' attempts so far simply to mimic Phaedrus is 
3 Rowe (1988, pg. 164) notes that "A reference to the Phaedo here would not be out of place, since the 
Phaedo 's main theme is the immortality of the soul, which is shortly to form the starting-point of Socrates' 
second speech on love," but fails fully to explore this connection, as I will try to do. 
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meant to show the reader that it is Phaedrus who is truly in need of purification. Yet, 
purification is the key thematic issue of the Phaedo as a whole. Socrates' dying words, 
"Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; pay the debt and do not be careless" (Phaedo, 118a; 
translation from Madison, 2002, pg. 435), are representative of this; the cock is owed to the 
god of purification because those present have been purified of misology. 4 Misology, hatred 
of argument, "is a danger that we should be on our guard against" (Phaedo, 89c ). Socrates 
thus urges his companions to "take my advice ... ; if you think what I say is true, then accept 
my conclusions; if not, you must oppose me with every argument you can muster; 
otherwise I might lead both you and myself astray through my enthusiasm" (Phaedo, 91 b-
c, italics added). From there, Socrates engages in one more extended attempt to prove the 
immortality of the soul and, at the end, everyone seems persuaded by it. 
Everyone, that is, except Simmias. 
4.2.2 Misuse of Language in the Phaedo 
'I can assure you', said Simmias, 'that I find it as impossible as you do to feel 
any doubt arising from our arguments; nevertheless the great importance of the 
matter under discussion, together with a poor opinion of human fallibility5, 
forces me still to remain doubtful about our assertions.' (Phaedo, 107 a-b). 
Socrates responds, "You are quite right there, Simmias, ... and I would add this: our original 
assumptions, acceptable as they are ... , ought nevertheless to be more precisely examined" 
(Phaedo, 1 07b ). The "assumptions" to which Socrates refers are, 
the existence of a beautiful that is in and by itself, and a good, and a great, and 
so on with the rest of them; and if you grant me them and admit their existence, 
I hope they will make it possible for me to discover and expound to you the 
cause of the soul's immortality (Phaedo, 100b). 
4 See Madison, 2002, for an extended argument for this unorthodox interpretation of Socrates' last words. 
5 See section 4.1.3. 
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Thus, the soul's immortality has not actually been proven at all! Yet, this was never the 
purpose of the "proof;" it was, instead, meant to bring Socrates' companions back from the 
brink of misology. How this mislogy, hatred of argument, could have come about is 
indicated in the last scene of the dialogue. Crito asks Socrates how he (Socrates) is to be 
buried and Socrates scolds him for thinking that he (Socrates) is to be buried when," .. .I 
have been maintaining this long while ... that when I have drunk the poison I shall no longer 
be with you" (Phaedo, 115c-d). His point is that, "misuse of language is not only 
distasteful in itself, but actually harmful to the soul. So you must be of good cheer, and say 
that you are burying my body ... " (Phaedo, 115e). 
Plato's dialogues6 often center on an interlocutor's "misuse of language." They often 
start with a definition, which Socrates inevitably proceeds to tum inside out. In the end, the 
interlocutor turns out to have no idea what was meant by the definition in the first place. In 
this respect, the Phaedo is no different; its purpose is to unveil a misuse of language. When 
one says that Socrates is dead, that statement automatically entails a number of deep and 
extensive metaphysical assumptions about the nature of death, the nature of the soul, and 
what happens to soul during and after death. It is these assumptions that constitute this 
misuse of language and, in their place, Socrates offers a second set of metaphysical 
assumptions, one upon which he bases his argument for the immortality of the soul. Yet 
this argument is itself admittedly faulty and requires reexamination of the very assumptions 
Socrates introduces. And it is precisely the reluctance to reexamine, the utter lack of faith 
in argument, that threatens the group that is gathered to watch Socrates (or his body) die. 
So why offer an argument that is admittedly faulty for the immortality of the soul? It 
is precisely what is needed in order for the discussion to continue. When misology 
6 See Meno, Euthyphro, Theaetetus, and Book 1 of the Republic for example. 
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threatens to overtake them all, Socrates insists on offering this argument and challenges 
them to oppose him if they can. Otherwise, the argument will come "to a dead end" 
(Phaedo, 89b) and cannot be "brought back to life" (ibid.), and this is "the worst thing that 
can befall a man" (Phaedo, 89d). Socrates expresses concern to defeat those "who are quite 
unconcerned about the truth of any question which may come up in debate, but devote all 
their effort to persuading the company to adopt their own thesis" (Phaedo, 91a) And he 
urges his companions also to have this concern "out of regard for your remaining lifetime" 
(Phaedo, 90e ). After all, misuse of language is "harmful to the soul" and it is the care of the 
soul to which Socrates refers when, dying, he says "do not be careless." 
4.2.3 Misuse of Language in the Phaedrus 
That Socrates, in the Phaedo, is concerned to defeat those who, unconcerned with truth, 
engage in persuasion provides the obvious link to the Phaedrus. So far, Lysias has been 
characterized as just this sort of person; his speech was in no way formed in order to best 
express the truth (lacking, as it did, a definition of love and insisting on repeating itself) 
and we already know that he is a sophist, a rhetorician, a speechwriter who aims merely to 
be clever. Lysias, we can see, is clearly unconcerned about the truth. 
Yet, so is Socrates. Near the very beginning of the Phaedrus, when Phaedrus asks 
Socrates whether he believes the myth of Boreas to be true, Socrates responds that he is not 
concerned with the truth of myths but instead explores how they make him better able to 
know himself (229c-230a; see section 2.1.4). Indeed, in the Phaedo passage (9la) above 
where Socrates expresses concern to defeat those unconcerned with truth, he prefaces his 
concern by saying, "very possibly it is not a love of wisdom that I am showing on this 
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present issue ... " (Phaedo, 9la). The urgency of Socrates' impending death forces him to 
neglect "love of wisdom" for the sake of his companions, who are in very real danger. 
However, in the Phaedrus, though the seriousness of Phaedrus' leaving the city is as 
pronounced as ever, the urgency is not so. The two are taking a leisurely walk outside the 
city and Socrates is in no hurry to direct his friend back in; on the contrary, Socrates does 
not want Phaedrus to re-enter the city until he is fully capable of dealing with those, like 
Lysias, who threaten to take advantage of his enthusiasm for discourse. 
Thus, in the Phaedrus, Socrates can take a much more confident and prolonged 
philosophical stance in dealing with his endangered companion. In so doing, and in virtue 
of their close friendship, Socrates can disclose his lack of concern for the truth of myths to 
Phaedrus. Indeed, Socrates finds it necessary to express this to Phaedrus; Socrates is less 
concerned with truth than with the extent to which he knows himself and it is Phaedrus' 
self-knowledge that is precisely at issue in the first half of the Phaedrus. Furthermore, even 
though Socrates, in the Phaedo, expresses distaste for those who wish to persuade others of 
their own thesis, he nevertheless, in the Phaedrus, is concerned through the palinode to 
persuade Phaedrus of what he is saying. Yet we must stop and consider the implications of 
these two aspects of Socrates' character (lack of concern for truth and willingness to 
persuade) in this dialogue. Even though, if he is persuaded by Socrates' palinode, Phaedrus 
will come to believe and hold as true those things expressed in the palinode, Phaedrus has 
also been shown by Socrates not to be concerned with the truth of myths. If Phaedrus is 
persuaded by the palinode, it will not be of its "truth;" it will be of some other aspect. 
Indeed, that Phaedrus is not fully convinced of the truth of the palinode is evidenced by his 
first remark once it is finished: ".if that be our good, Socrates, I join in your prayer for it" 
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(257b, italics added. See section 5.1.1). Firstly, Phaedrus' "if' shows that he harbors some 
doubts about whether the palinode does indeed express the truth. Secondly, though, and 
more importantly, that Phaedrus proceeds not to discuss the palinode and the preceding 
speeches (as he expressed his wish to do at 242a) but to discuss the principles of 
speech writing itself shows that he is indeed unconcerned with the palinode's literal truth.7 
In the Phaedo, the arguments Socrates puts forward for the immortality of the soul 
were meant to purify his companions of their impending misology and allow the discussion 
to continue. Similarly, the palinode in the Phaedrus serves to purify Phaedrus of the 
opposite of misology; enthusiasm for discourse. 8 Significantly, both misology and 
enthusiasm for discourse, though they are opposites, spring from the same source: misuse 
of language. Phaedrus' misuse of language is constituted by his inability to examine the 
arguments he hears. He simply sits in awe of the cleverness of it all and seems to be 
convinced of the truth of such arguments on that basis alone. In other words, Phaedrus' 
misuse of language resides in the fact that he gives it too much credit; fine language is 
taken for granted as the criterion for truth, and his own judgment of the fineness of a 
discourse is sufficient. But, as Socrates demonstrates in the palinode, the "renown of man" 
should be of no consequence in evaluating the truth of arguments. Human beings who 
know themselves know that they know nothing; they are no standard by which to judge the 
truth of arguments. The sooner Phaedrus recognizes this, the sooner he can more 
adequately deal with the sophists and speechwriters of the city. 
7 I have yet to find a similar exploration of the implication of Socrates' attitude toward myths (229c-230a) on 
possible readings of the palinode. 
8 Though several commentators, such as White (1993, pgs. 55-57), Hackforth (1952, pg. 54), and Rowe (see 
note 3, pg. 38, above) notice the allusions and connections to the Phaedo throughout this section of the 
Phaedrus, none that I have read come to these conclusions about the nature and extent of the link between 
these two dialogues. 
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Chapter 5: 257b-279c 
5.1 Transition 
5 .1.1 Phaedrus' Reaction 
With the completion of the palinode, Socrates has broken the spell that had gripped 
Phaedrus up to this moment: enthusiasm for rhetoric. This is evidenced by two things that 
Phaedrus says right away as Socrates finishes. His first comment upon completion of the 
palinode's finishing prayer is, "If that be for our good, Socrates, I join in your prayer for 
it." That Phaedrus is not entirely convinced by the speech he has just heard, that he is not 
persuaded by it, is apparent given his non-committal "if," which contrasts sharply with the 
enthusiasm that had previously gripped him after reading Lysias' speech and hearing 
Socrates' first speech. Also, given the immense beauty and power of the palinode, 
Phaedrus' reluctance to compliment it as liberally as he did the previous speeches is 
especially surprising. 1 Thus, Phaedrus is no longer susceptible to the clever rhetoric of 
speech-writers. 
Secondly, Phaedrus' comment that "I shall find Lysias cutting a poor figure, if he 
proves to be willing to compete with another speech of his own," is but further evidence 
that Phaedrus is no longer a lover of speeches. After Phaedrus read Lysias' speech, 
Socrates remarked at Phaedrus' "apparent delight in the words you read" (234d). Now, 
however, after listening to Socrates' palinode, Phaedrus expresses doubt as to whether 
Lysias can compete. Thus, through his palinode, Socrates has broken the spell which 
Lysias' "terrible" (242d) speech had on Phaedrus. 
1 Griswold describes Phaedrus' reaction to the palinode as "abysmally poor" (2002, pg. 97), but such a 
description fails fully to explore the thematic issues surrounding that reaction, as I will try to do. 
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Yet, something else has changed as the palinode ends. Indeed, Hackforth notices a 
"lowering of emotional tone" (1952, pg. 116); as does Griswold, who comments on the 
"sudden shift in style and tone here, as well [as] a tum to questions of method and techne 
[sic] from questions about eros [sic] ... " (1996, pg. 159). Phaedrus now introduces a topic 
of discussion noticeably sober in comparison to what has so far been at issue. As we will 
see, the enthusiasm for speeches about love that Phaedrus previously exuded has been 
replaced by a rather cold interest in the technicalities of speech-making. The sudden change 
of tone is noteworthy for dramatic reasons and Plato is accentuating it here for a distinct 
purpose. Love, which has been at issue from the beginning of this dialogue, will become 
more and more noticeably absent from the discussion about to commence. 
5.1.2 Said and Done 
Phaedrus next (257c) recalls that a politician was recently "railing at [Lysias] and 
reproaching him ... , constantly dubbing him a 'speech-writer'; so possibly we shall find 
him desisting from further composition to preserve his reputation" (257c ). Socrates insists, 
instead, that perhaps the politician did not mean this as a reproach. Curiously, Socrates 
compares Phaedrus' lack of understanding of the relation between politics and speech-
writing to his lack of understanding of the phrase "Pleasant Bend," which "comes from the 
long bend ofthe Nile" (257d-e). However, Nehamas and Woodruff note that this phrase is 
"a familiar example of something named by language that means the opposite - though 
called "pleasant" it was really a long, nasty bend" (1995, pg. 49, n. 124). 
Socrates wishes to draw Phaedrus' attention to how language can be used to say one 
thing but mean something completely different. Needless to say, it would not be obvious to 
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whoever heard the phrase "Pleasant Bend" that the bend was, in reality, quite unpleasant. 
" ... [P]eople sometimes mean just the opposite of what they say. That, suggests Socrates, is 
the case with Phaedrus's [sic] abusive politician" (Hackforth, 1952, pg. 114). Upon the 
ensuing examination, it appears that no politician would reproach someone for writing 
speeches, since, in reality, politicians often place great weight on the speeches they write 
(258a-c). 
However, there is another dimension to this exchange between Socrates and 
Phaedrus. The politicians do mean what they say about Lysias as a reproach, but Socrates 
suggests that this cannot be the case, since politicians often do exactly what they are 
accusing Lysias of doing. As a result, Socrates is pointing to the difference between what is 
said and what is done. Language can be misused and, thus, misleading; one must look 
beyond it in order to derive some meaning from it. Looking beyond it, of course, means 
judging whether and how it loses its meaning. In a few moments, Socrates will point to 
how "contending with words is a practice ... which enables people to make out everything to 
be like everything else ... " (261d-e). So, describing a nasty bend as "pleasant" means 
imposing synonymity between nastiness and pleasure, and doing so prevents a listener from 
deriving meaning, since "nasty" and "pleasant" are antonyms. However, a listener who 
attends to what is not said as much to what is said (see section 1.1) will undoubtedly 
recognize the sarcastic irony of calling a nasty bend "pleasant." Similarly, a listener who 
hears a politician harass a rhetorician for speech-writing will clearly recognize the irony 
once he or she looks beyond the politician's words. Once the politician is shown to be as 
much a speech-writer as the rhetorician, the listener will comprehend the irony (even if the 
politician does not!). 
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Plato is here foreshadowing the irony of the discussion of rhetoric and dialectic that 
will soon commence. 2 The irony will take a similar form to that involved in calling a nasty 
bend "pleasant," or in a speech-writing politician's accusing someone of speech-writing; 
namely, there will be a difference between what is said and what is done. In order to derive 
meaning from the discussion of rhetoric and dialectic that constitutes the Phaedrus' second 
half, we must look beyond what is explicitly said within that discussion. We will have to 
inspect whether what is enacted in that discussion differs irreconcilably from the discussion 
itself. 
5.1.3 The Myth ofthe Cicadas 
The discussion, however, is preceded by a myth, told by Socrates, which foreshadows the 
key issues of the subsequent discussion. This, the myth of the cicadas, constitutes the final 
signpost of the dialogue. 
The story is that once upon a time these creatures were men ... of an age before 
there were any Muses: and that when the latter came into the world, and music 
made its appearance, some of the people of those days were so thrilled with 
pleasure that they went on singing ... until they actually died without noticing it. 
From them in due course sprang the race of cicadas, to which the Muses have 
granted the boon ... of singing from the very first, ... until the day of their death: 
after which they go and report to the Muses how they severally are paid honour 
amongst mankind, and by whom ... To the eldest, Calliope, and to ... Urania, 
they tell of those who live a life of philosophy and so do honour to the music of 
those ... whose song is the noblest [kallisten] of them all. (259b-d) 
Socrates also remarks that, 
[T]he cicadas overhead, singing after their wont in the hot sun and conversing 
with one another, don't fail to observe us ... So if they were to see us two 
behaving like ordinary folk at midday, not conversing but dozing lazy-minded 
under their spell, they would very properly have the laugh of us ... If however 
2 To my knowledge, no other commentator has so interpreted this discussion of the politician's reproach of 
Lysias. 
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they see us conversing and steering clear of their bewitching siren-song, they 
might feel respect for us ... (258e-259b) 
This myth of the cicadas serves to collect and highlight the issues of the palinode that will 
be operative in the ensuing discussion. 
There is accentuated within this myth a sense of need. The fate of the cicada-men is 
not to be desired; why else would Socrates characterize his conversation with Phaedrus as 
"steering clear of their bewitching siren-song"? The prescription for so steering-clear is 
something that would not be possible if the two discussants were not both present to so 
converse; that is, Socrates and Phaedrus can avoid the lull of the cicadas' song only by 
engaging in something that necessarily involves both of them: conversation. Indeed, 
conversation requires more than just the involvement of each of them; it requires an 
involvement characterized by direct engagement with each other. Without the possibility of 
such engagement, the two would almost certainly succumb to a deadly sleep. 
On that note, it is worth pointing out that Socrates here indicates that he and Phaedrus 
are equally susceptible to the singing cicadas. The irony in the first half of the dialogue that 
signaled Socrates' comic mimicking of Phaedrus is no longer present. There, Socrates 
attributed qualities such as enthusiasm for rhetoric, which were obviously Phaedrus', to 
himself; here, however, he is referring to the situation in which they both find themselves: 
in need of each other if they are to avoid the lulling song of the cicadas. In addition, the 
deadly seriousness of the myth impedes a reader's possible interpretation of it as comic. 
The danger that has been hiding in the drama of the Phaedrus up to now is tensely felt here. 
Socrates and Phaedrus are both depicted as at serious risk if they do not engage each other 
in conversation. But what is the risk they run? 
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While Hackforth's translation of the myth ofthe cicadas contains the word "noblest," 
the Greek word is actually "kallisten" (Thompson, 1973), which is derived from the Greek 
for "beauty."3 The palinode describes the moment in the soul of a lover when he encounters 
his beloved: 
At that sight the [chariot] driver's memory goes back to [the] form of Beauty ... 
[Then] in awe and reverence he falls upon his back, and therewith is compelled 
to pull the reins so violently that he brings both steeds down on their haunches. 
[The bad horse], contriving to recover his wind after the pain of the bit and his 
fall, bursts into angry abuse ... (254b-c) 
However, "if the victory be won by the higher elements of mind guiding them [i.e. lover 
and beloved] into the ordered rule of the philosophic life, their days on earth will be blessed 
with happiness and concord ... : they have won self-mastery ... " (256a-b). Finally, the 
palinode concludes by assuring us that such a pair are the dearest of friends (256c). 
The most beautiful [ kallisten] song is sung by the cicadas who report, to the muse of 
philosophy, "those who live a life of philosophy" (259d), the life that the palinode 
describes as "blessed with happiness and concord" (256b ). Yet beauty has already been 
depicted as ultimately dangerous, as leading to an enthusiastic thrill that can tum deadly. 
The key to this dilemma is contained in the palinode, where we are told that a philosophical 
life between friends achieves victory over the bad horse's overenthusiastic reaction to the 
recollection of beauty (256c ). A philosophical interaction between friends, an interaction 
through conversation as Socrates prescribes, constitutes a recollection of beauty guided "by 
the higher elements of mind (256a). An undisciplined reaction to such a recollection, one 
3 Rowe (1988) translates kallisten as "most beautiful." 
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that becomes so enamoured with the beautiful as to attempt to engage it directly, can have 
deadly consequences.4 
Friendship is the key to self-mastery. This conclusion of the palinode makes explicit 
what has been enacted all through the first half of the Phaedrus, in which Socrates has led 
Phaedrus to self-knowledge in virtue of their friendship. As the Phaedrus began, the 
friendship was at serious risk; Phaedrus' enthusiasm for beautiful rhetoric blinded him to 
his friend's efforts to act as guide back to the city. However, the myth of the cicadas makes 
no explicit mention of friendship, even though friendship is clearly the key to avoiding the 
dangers that that myth describes. This myth, then, is the final signpost of the dialogue; but 
it is not a signpost erected by Socrates for Phaedrus' benefit. Rather, it is erected by Plato 
for the reader's benefit. As we will see, the myth of the cicadas brilliantly foreshadows 
everything that goes wrong in the second half of the Phaedrus. 5 For, as the discussion 
progresses, Socrates will himself display an enthusiasm, in the midst of which he neglects 
his friendship, that puts into serious question his own degree of self-mastery. 6 
4 The palinode depicts the human soul as "confounded by her steeds" such that "she has much ado to discern 
the things that are ... and by reason of her unruly steeds sees in part, but in part sees not" (248a). It is fitting, 
then, that since the human soul is not allowed more than a fleeting glimpse of true beauty the living human 
being risks his or her life in trying to directly engage earthly beauty. 
5 Hackforth offers several interpretations of the myth pertaining to its role in the dramatic development in the 
Phaedrus. That it provides "a temporary relaxation of the reader's mind by means of a charming little myth" 
(1955, pg. 118) is, I feel, entirely mistaken. If anything, the myth of the cicadas, the last signpost, requires a 
great deal of strict attention. However, another ofHackforth's suggestions, that the myth "[appeals], under 
cover of a warning by Socrates to Phaedrus and himself against lazy-mindedness, for a renewal (or 
continuance) of the reader's attention" (ibid.) is much more fitting. In thus drawing the reader into the 
discussion, Plato highlights an aspect of his writing that will soon be at issue in the dialogue itself. 
6 That Socrates, in the second half of the Phaedrus, may lack the heroism interpreters usually attribute to his 
character in all of Plato's dialogues, was suggested to me by Dr. James Bradley. 
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5.2 The Discussion 
5.2.1 The Politics of Speaking and Writing 
The issue Socrates and Phaedrus mean to discuss is "the nature of good and bad speaking 
and writing" (259e). When asked whether "a good and successful discourse presupposes a 
knowledge in the mind of the speaker ofthe truth ofhis subject" (ibid.), Phaedrus responds 
that a speaker only needs to know what will be thought true by his or her listeners; it is on 
this "that persuasion depends" (260a). Phaedrus' remark about persuasion and about the 
necessity of the speaker's knowledge of truth provokes Socrates to present an argument 
that is perhaps Plato's strongest hint about the danger inherent in susceptibility to clever 
rhetoric. Comically, Socrates hypothetically proposes that, while not knowing what a horse 
was but knowing that Phaedrus thinks a horse is that which fits the description of a donkey, 
he try to persuade Phaedrus to acquire the "horse" and to use it for carrying equipment and 
riding on into battle. When Phaedrus repeatedly refers to such a proposal as "ridiculous" 
(260b-c), Socrates asks, "Well, isn't it better to be a ridiculous friend than a clever 
enemy?" (260c ). Though at first glance this may seem like just another instance of ironic 
self-deprecation on Socrates' part, it is more than that; Plato is showing his hand here in 
order to foreshadow what is corning. What will make Socrates a ridiculous friend is his 
forgetting of friendship altogether.7 Though here the ridiculousness of this situation 
reminds the reader of the intentional self-forgetting that constituted the comedy of 
Socrates' first speech, the absence of friendship in the discussion as it progresses will grow 
more and more serious. 
7 No other interpreter with whom I am familiar has noticed this meaning of Socrates' description of himself as 
a "ridiculous friend" within the wider context of the second half of the dialogue. 
51 
Socrates' next question IS a succinct expressiOn of the danger that has so far 
threatened Phaedrus, and has provoked the entire dialogue . 
. . . [When] a master of oratory, who is ignorant of good and evil, employs his 
power of persuasion on a community (polin8) as ignorant as himself, not by 
extolling a miserable donkey as being really a horse, but by extolling evil as 
being really good: and when by studying the beliefs of the masses he persuades 
them to do evil instead of good, what kind of crop do you think his oratory is 
likely to reap from the seed thus sown? (260c-d) 
The political implications ofthis question are undeniable and it is perhaps the most explicit 
expression of the political dimension of the dialogue.9 Politics, in fact, remains at issue as 
Socrates and Phaedrus proceed to investigate speaking and writing as they occur in "public 
affairs or private, whether in the verse of the poet or the plain speech of prose" (258d). 
Socrates' first question to Phaedrus on this topic is, 
Must not the art of rhetoric, taken as a whole, be a kind of influencing of 
the mind by means of words, not only in courts of law and other public 
gatherings, but in private places also? And must it not be the same art that is 
concerned with great issues and small, its right employment commanding no 
more respect when dealing with important matters than with unimportant? 
(261a) 
Thus Socrates' first priority is considerably to widen the arena in which rhetoric as 
rhetoric, and writing as writing, can be said to take place. Phaedrus is reluctant, insisting 
that these only take place in lawsuits and public speeches (261 b). That Socrates 
subsequently (261 bff.) spends a little time convincing Phaedrus otherwise reflects what 
Plato wants to do here. As we will soon see, speaking and writing have strong political 
associations. In widening the application of the terms "rhetoric" and "writing," Plato is 
8 Both Rowe (1988) and Nehamas and Woodruff(1995) translate polin as "city." 
9 Hackforth observes that "behind the immediate subject of discussion Plato has in his mind what is seldom 
long absent from it, namely contemporary public morality, good and evil, justice and injustice in the fpolis ]" 
( 1952, pg. 122). I could not agree more with this comment, though I would add that it applies to the entire 
dialogue, if not all of Plato's work. Hackforth's further comment, "but this line of thought is not here 
pursued" (ibid.), shows, I think, a lack of depth in Hackforth's reading. Here he is correct with regard to the 
explicit discussion, but the underlying theme is as political as Plato gets. 
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simultaneously widening the reader's conception of politics. Indeed, we have seen all 
through the Phaedrus 10 that the city itself constitutes the political background of the 
journey the two friends are taking outside its walls. It is not just the politicians and lawyers 
that engage in politics; it is everyone in the city in virtue of their living in a city, i.e. insofar 
as those living in the city are forced to encounter and engage in conversation with other 
people. " ... [Contending] with words is a practice found not only in lawsuits and public 
harangues but, it seems, wherever men speak ... " (261d-e). Thus Plato "prompts us to 
rethink what we construe as 'political', and to reconsider our implication in its life via the 
various kinds of discourse that constitute the polis" (Scott, 2005, pg. 204). 
5 .2.2 Collection and Division 
Socrates asks if we are misled "when the difference between two things is wide, or narrow" 
(261e). Together, Socrates and Phaedrus reach the conclusion that "the art of speech 
displayed by one who has gone chasing after beliefs, instead of knowing the truth" (262c) 
will be "comical," since such a person would themselves have no knowledge of the 
distinctions between things and so would have no ability cleverly to confuse such 
distinctions for the purposes of persuasion. Thus someone who had obtained such 
knowledge, and hence such ability, could make use of 
a certain pair of procedures ... The first is that in which we bring a dispersed 
plurality under a single form, seeing it all together: the purpose being to define 
so-and-so, and thus to make plain whatever may be chosen as the topic for 
exposition. (265d) 
The second procedure is "the reverse of the other, whereby we are enabled to divide into 
forms, following the objective articulation ... " (265e). Socrates asserts that anybody "able 
10 And also in the Republic and the Apology. 
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to discern an objective unity and plurality .. .I call [a dialectician]." A little later on, the 
procedure is again given articulation: 
... anyone ... who seriously proffers a scientific rhetoric, will, in the first place, 
describe the soul very precisely ... [Secondly] he will describe what natural 
capacity it has to act upon what, and through what means, or by what it can be 
acted upon ... Thirdly, he will classify types of discourse and the types of soul, 
and the various ways in which souls are affected, ... suggesting the type of 
speech appropriate to each type of soul... (271a-b) 
And, once more, at 273d-e: 
unless the aspirant to oratory can on the one hand list the various natures 
amongst his prospective audiences, and on the other divide things into their 
kinds and embrace each individual thing under a single form, he will never 
attain such success as is within the grasp ofmankind. 
Quite a lot of time is given to laying out the specifics of this procedure. It is obvious that 
Plato wishes to call the reader's attention to it and, furthermore, he wants to emphasize that 
this procedure deserves such careful attention as is recommended in the myth of the 
cicadas. Many scholars have indeed given careful attention to the method of collection and 
division and have taken it as one of the fundamental tenets of Platonic thought. Indeed, for 
Plato the method is essential. 11 But its presence in the Phaedrus plays a role more dramatic 
than philosophical. 
5.2.3 Absence ofFriendship 
At 271c, Socrates rejects anyone's claim, "to write scientifically until they compose their 
speeches and writings in the way we have indicated." When Phaedrus inquires as to what 
specific way has been indicated, Socrates avoids answering it: "To give the actual words 
would be troublesome; but I am quite ready to say how one ought to compose if he means 
11 The method is given further consideration, though in different contexts, in the Sophist, the Statesman, and 
the Philebus. 
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to be as scientific as possible" (ibid.). From there, as Hackforth notes, Socrates "further 
[elucidates] the theory of oratory which he has already adumbrated" (1952, pg. 148, n.2). 
That Socrates chooses to repeat himself rather than give an example of the dialectical 
method he has so far described is meant to make the reader suspicious: why would Socrates 
refuse to describe as exhaustively as possible such an important method? A little further on, 
after asking "whether the delivery and composition of speeches is honourable or base" 
(277d), Socrates answers himselfby saying, "our earlier conclusions have, I think, shown-" 
(ibid.). Here Phaedrus interrupts: "Which conclusions?" (ibid.). However, "Socrates 
continues his sentence as though there had been no interruption" (Hackforth, 1955, pg. 161, 
n.2): "They have shown that..." (277d). 
In this instance, Socrates appears to be engaging in a conversation with himself and, 
to make matters worse, does not even acknowledge Phaedrus' interruption. Here, in the 
climactic moment of the dialogue, it is made clear to the reader exactly what has happened: 
Socrates has been overcome with enthusiasm; namely, enthusiasm for the method he is 
now ranting incessantly about. The reader may recall that, during the myth of the cicadas, 
Socrates insisted on conversation, as that was the only safeguard against submission to the 
lulling song of the cicadas (259a-b; see section 5.1.3). In that myth, it was suggested that 
those involved in conversation would be reported with favour, by the cicadas, to the muse 
of philosophy (259c ). Socrates, in ignoring his friend (and also his friendship), has strayed 
from conversation and, thus, from philosophy. 
We must stop and consider the multiple dimensions of this moment. 
The topic of conversation thus far has been philosophy. The method of collection and 
division, which Socrates has been describing through most of the discussion, is the method 
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of the lover of wisdom (278d). However, any mention of "love," the locus of discussion in 
the first half of the dialogue, is conspicuously absent. The last discussion of love in the 
dialogue occurred in the palinode where the most philosophical form of love was identified 
as friendship (256c ). All through the dialogue, right up until the myth of the cicadas, 
friendship has been portrayed as the condition of the possibility of the conversational 
interaction of Socrates and Phaedrus. Thus, in the second half of the dialogue, ignoring 
friendship in the explicit discussion suggests an irony foreshadowed by the discussion of 
the "pleasant bend" (257d-e; see section 5.1.2). Socrates' exposition of the dialectical 
method fails to meet the essential requirements of that method: the real dialogical 
interchange that can take place between friends. The irony here unites the dialogue in that 
what was explicitly present in the first half of the dialogue is explicitly absent in the second 
half of the dialogue. Yet, explicit discussion aside, "love," specifically the philosophical 
love known as friendship, has been non-verbally present throughout the dialogue and is 
present here in that it is conspicuous in its absence. 
But there is more: at the crucial climactic moment of the dialogue, the irony 
collapses. The tension reaches the breaking point when Socrates, in ignoring his co-
discussant and thus exposing himself to enthusiasm, ignores friendship in what he says as 
well as what he does. We must recall that the entire first half of the Phaedrus is shaped by 
Socrates' efforts to guide Phaedrus to self-knowledge so he may safely re-enter the city. 
Recall also that the palinode refers to friendship, the most philosophical form of love, as 
"self-mastery" (256b ). Socrates, in here posing a risk to his friendship, exposes his own 
need for self-knowledge (230a) and, by extension, his own need for preparation before re-
entering the city. 
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An additional dimension to this moment, and perhaps the most crucial one, is the 
topic of the discussion during which the climax takes place. Socrates has just spent some 
time explaining why writing is inferior to speaking. His pursuit of, and obvious enthusiasm 
for, the philosophical method of dialectic has led him to exclude writing as a worthwhile 
endeavour. The ultimate irony here, noticed by dozens of commentators but never, to my 
knowledge, fully analyzed, is that Socrates' own spoken criticisms of writing lack all the 
dialogical interchange for which he criticizes writing. Writings, when spoken to, do not 
answer (275d); neither, apparently, does an enthusiastic Socrates when Phaedrus asks some 
important clarifying questions. Socrates' ridiculousness has reached the point where he is 
doing exactly what he condemns. 
It is here, however, that the Phaedrus further compounds the irony of its climactic 
moment by pointing directly at its author and, in so doing, decisively pointing past the text. 
Given that Socrates throughout the second half of the dialogue has been falling victim more 
and more to a genuine self-forgetting, we can interpret his criticism of writing as Plato 
himself pointing to Socrates' inability adequately to interact with the citizens of the city so 
long as he retains his enthusiasm. Yet this point is not explicitly written in some discourse 
or speech; rather, it is enacted all through the dramatic dimension of the dialogue. The 
Phaedrus highlights Plato's attempts to write dialectically, and, in doing so, he has 
decisively surpassed Socrates' criticisms of writing. In fact, this feature of Plato's writing 
proves more engaging than is Socrates at this climactic moment. As we about to see, the 
dialogue ends on a note of uncertainty, of aporia (as do all of Plato's dialogues); in so 
doing, the Phaedrus urges its reader's interaction and close attention to the text. In other 
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words, the reader of the Phaedrus must engage it as one might engage a friend m 
conversation. 
5.3 The End 
And so the Phaedrus ends, moments after a climactic tension that is not resolved. The 
reader is meant to take this tension with him or her as (s)he leaves the dialogue. However, 
Plato gives the reader one more nudge, a hint about the true concerns of the Phaedrus. 
After Socrates offers a prayer to the gods of the place they have occupied nearly all through 
the dialogue, Phaedrus requests that he, "Make it a prayer for me too, since friends have all 
things in common" (279c). Phaedrus' acknowledgement of friendship, and particularly of 
this friendship between Socrates and Phaedrus, is an indication that he has at least begun to 
catch on to what has been happening all around him since he left the city. With this 
comment, it has become apparent that Phaedrus is engaged in a healthy movement back 
toward the city. Indeed, Socrates replies "Let us be going" (ibid.). As Phaedrus' mention of 
friendship serves to thematize what has been enacted, from start to finish, throughout the 
dialogue, so does Socrates' response indicate that the friendship shared by Socrates and 
Phaedrus has provoked and sustained their movement through the entire discussion (see 
section 2.1.2). And again, here at the end of the dialogue, the two friends continue their 
movement, and that they do so immediately after an explicit acknowledgement of their 
friendship is far from insignificant. 
Yet the dialogue ends as the two remain outside the city. This is most significant, and 
it is a feature that does not even become fully apparent until after the reader has finished 
the dialogue. Only after all the words have been read can the reader fully grasp that the 
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dialogue has ended before a safe re-entry into Athens. Socrates simply says "Let us be 
going" and the dialogue is over. This is Plato's strongest hint that the issues are far from 
resolved. The Phaedrus began inside the city, but the two friends have not yet made it all 
the way back when it ends. The political side of this dialogue has never been more 
pronounced; that the two men do not make it back inside the city walls before the end of 
the Phaedrus is a strong indication that the issues presented all through the dialogue need 
further consideration and discussion before re-entry can be possible. 
The Phaedrus' political dimension stems from that fact that all through it the polis is 
simultaneously present and absent; though it has been largely absent from the explicit 
content of the dialogue, it has been unquestionably present in the dramatic elements that 
frame the dialogue. Furthermore, especially at the end, the city is conspicuously absent; for 
the reader is left wondering whether the two friends make it back inside its walls. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
A reading ofPlato's Phaedrus that takes into account all of its literary aspects reveals 
elements of the work that are not identifiable in the explicit discussion that constitutes the 
dialogue. I have shown that Plato takes great pains to integrate the setting, the choice of 
words, the characters and their actions, and even himself as author, in order to point to 
issues that lie outside the text itself. Specifically, these aspects add a distinctively political 
dimension to the dialogue. All through it the city lies in the background; its walls loom 
behind the characters, who are engaged in a sustained effort to prepare themselves to return 
to the city. This preparation itself, as the dialogue makes clear, is only possible insofar as 
friendship is present between the two characters. As soon as this friendship is forgotten, the 
friends risk never being able adequately to engage with each other and so with those in the 
city. The city, the polis, is only such insofar as its citizens interact with one another; 
without that interaction the polis ceases to exist. Thus, a citizen who neglects to 
acknowledge and embrace his or her need for the other citizens of the city, and to realize 
that that need is the condition of the possibility of the city, is in a bad way politically. 
Friendship, insofar as it entails the acknowledgement of need, is necessarily political. 
My reading of the Phaedrus is of course a limited one; these limits, in fact, are self-
imposed by my examining primarily the literary aspects of the dialogue. No great work of 
literature is done justice to by a single reading. Thus, I cannot present my reading as final 
or decisive. 
Yet, at least in respect of the Phaedrus, I do hope to have shown what is so often 
merely said of Plato: that in his work literary form and philosophical content are 
inseparable. 
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